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Preface 
 
This thesis is composed of three distinct essays with relatively disparate 
topics. Each essay constitutes an entity on its own and can therefore be read 
independently from the others. The first essay proposes a new method to 
compute the fundamental price of stocks. It also studies in detail the 
empirical link between the price observed on international markets and the 
estimated fundamental price. The second essay assesses the ability of recent 
behavioural models to match the path of excess returns observed on the 
American stock markets. Finally, the third essay, written with Nicole 
Allenspach, examines the evolutions of banks' common exposure to shocks 
and of systemic risk in the banking sector since 1993, as well as the link 
between them. 
 
During the long journey through this thesis, I constantly benefited from the 
support of my advisor Thorsten Hens. I am particularly thankful to him for 
systematically including me in the activities of his academic group, even if 
my particular situation as external PhD student tended to keep me away 
from university. I also thank him for giving me enough time to explore 
several ideas before fixing my attention on the three topics presented in this 
thesis. I am also extremely grateful to my co-advisor Mathias Hoffmann for 
his very pertinent comments, especially on the first essay of this thesis. 
 
I was also privileged to benefit from the very helpful and supportive 
environment of the Financial Stability Unit at the Swiss National Bank. I am 
particularly grateful to Bertrand Rime, who allowed me time and freedom to 
work on this thesis, probably sometimes at the expense of more "systemic-
relevant" projects. I also thank Robert Bichsel for its relaxed, but dedicated, 
supervision during these years. This experience would not have been as 
interesting as it was without the motivating and stimulating conversations 
with my colleagues Ulrike Bilgram, Urs Birchler, Jürg Blum, Dorothe 
Bonjour, Matteo Facchinetti, Sonja Gerber, Jeannette Henggeler-Müller, 
Christian Hott, Hansjörg Lehmann, and Reto Nyffeler. I particularly enjoyed 
the collaboration with Nicole Allenspach, who worked with me on the third 
essay of this thesis. 
 
I also would like to thank my parents, Jacqueline and Daniel Monnin, to 
whom I am deeply indebted, not only for their support during these last 
years. They have always been a leading example for me and this thesis is, in 
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large part, the result of the exceptional and stimulating intellectual 
environment that they provided me with during my life. 
 
Finally, I would probably never have completed this work without my wife 
Nellie by my side during the last seven years. More than anybody else, she 
experienced with me the highs and lows of writing this thesis. Her constant 
encouragements and infinite patience were a great support and mean more 
than I can say. 
 
 
Zurich, March 2008 Pierre Monnin 
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Part I 
 
Stock Price with Consumption CAPM: An
International Comparison ?
Pierre Monnin a;b
aSwiss National Bank, Financial Stability, Börsenstrasse 15, P.O. Box, 8022
Zurich, Switzerland
bSwiss Banking Insitute, University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich,
Switzerland
Abstract
What is the fundamental value of a stock and do prices deviate from it? This paper
answers these questions by using a Consumption-Capital Asset Pricing Model. I
rst show how to express the fundamental price as a function of expected future
dividends and consumption as well as of their future conditional variance and covari-
ance. Secondly, I estimate the fundamental price for the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland from 1965 through to 2006. I focus in particular
on the impact of the decreasing ination observed in this period, through structural
changes in dividends and in risk premiums or through money illusion. Thirdly, I
show that the gap between the price and its fundamental value decreases after a
shock, which suggests a link between them. Finally, I show that forecasts using the
fundamental price are more accurate than forecasts based on the observed price
only or based on simpler fundamental models.
Key words: Fundamental stock price, Consumption CAPM, Ination,
Out-of-sample forecasts.
JEL classication: D53, E44, G12.
? The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reect the views of the Swiss National Bank.
1 Introduction
What is a stock really worth? Do stock prices deviate from this fundamen-
tal (or fair) value? And if they deviate, do they eventually go back to their
fundamental value? Such questions have been prominent topics for decades
in the nance profession. Many economic agents are interested in their an-
swers: shareholders, who are comparing investment alternatives, traders, who
are looking for speculation opportunities, or central bankers, who try to iden-
tify stock market imbalances that could threaten the economy. In this pa-
per, I study these three questions with a stock valuation model based on the
Consumption-Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM) (Lucas, 1978, Breeden,
1979). I rst show how to use the no-arbitrage condition of the C-CAPM to
express the fundamental stock price as a function of expected dividends and
consumption, as well as of their covariance. I then estimate the fundamental
stock price (and deviations from it) for four countries: the United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland. I focus in particular on the impact
of the decrease in ination observed in the eighties on stock prices. I esti-
mate this impact via the changes in real dividend growth and in risk premium
that decreasing ination can cause and via the possible money illusion that
it can create. Finally, I assess the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the
C-CAPM fundamental model. I nd that forecasts based on the C-CAPM
fundamental price signicantly outperform forecasts based on the observed
price or on indicators that are known to have some predictive power (e.g. the
price-to-dividend ratio).
Not surprisingly given the interest that fundamental stock prices arouse, acad-
emics or practitioners have proposed several models to estimate them. A large
majority of them are based on the discounted cash ow model (or net present
value model), which states that the fundamental stock price is equal to the sum
of the discounted expected payo¤s of the stock. 1 This type of model requires a
forecast of future cash ows generated by the stock, along with an appropriate
discount rate. The most basic model in this category is the Gordon growth
model (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956, Gordon, 1962). In this model, stockspay-
o¤s are the dividends. Future discount rates and the future dividend growth
rate are both constant. Many authors have rened this model. 2 The rst line
of innovation is to use dividend forecasts that are more realistic than a constant
growth rate. For example, Shiller (1981, 2005) uses ex-post realised dividends.
1 Lee (1998), Dupuis and Tessier (2003), Zhong, Darrat, and Anderson (2003) and
Borio and Lowe (2002) are some of the few exceptions to the net present value model
(although the former three indirectly build their method on it). They all measure
the fundamental price by separating the permanent component of stock prices from
their temporary and non-fundamental component.
2 An exhaustive survey of the literature on fundamental prices is beyond the scope
of this paper. Only a selective list of the main innovations is presented here.
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Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Becchetti and Mattesini (2005) or Bagella, Bec-
chetti, and Adriani (2005) use a two-stage model, in which short-term forecasts
are given by analysts and long-term forecasts are determined by the historical
growth rate. A similar three-stage model is proposed by Panigirtzoglou and
Scammell (2002). Yao (1997) separates increasing dividends from decreasing
dividends. The second line of developments concentrates on the denition of
future cash ow. Ang and Liu (2001), Vuolteenaho (2002) or Dong and Hirsh-
leifer (2005) use earnings instead of dividends; Black, Fraser, and Groenewold
(2003a,b) use prots. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) or Pástor and
Veronesi (2006) choose the market-to-book value ratio instead of the price-
dividend ratio (PD ratios hereafter). The third line of improvement concerns
the econometric methodology with the use of panel studies rather than single
time series (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999, Becchetti and Adriani, 2004,
Gentry, Jones, and Mayer, 2004). Lastly, some authors have studied the net
present value model in a general equilibrium framework (Black, Fraser, and
Groenewold, 2003a,b, Kinley, 2004). In contrast to the dividends dynamic,
the dynamic of the discount factor has received little attention. In general,
the discount factor is constant and is estimated by the CAPM. Campbell and
Shiller (1987, 1988b,a) have lled this gap by modelling the dynamic of both
dividends and interest rates with a VAR model. They use the estimated joint
dynamic to obtain a proxy of agentsexpectations. Their VAR approach is the
starting point of an impressive body of literature (not all of which is devoted
to the estimation of fundamental values).
The fundamental model presented in this paper is in the spirit of the VAR
fundamental model developed by Campbell and Shiller (CS hereafter). Like
the models cited previously, it is based on the discounted cash-ow model, but
it di¤ers from them by using a stochastic discount factor (SDF) based on the
no-arbitrage condition of the C-CAPM (Lucas, 1978, Breeden, 1979). In most
of the papers cited above, the SDF is given by the traditional CAPM. I use the
C-CAPM for two main reasons: rstly, this model is based on sound economic
arguments explaining consumption and investment decisions of a representa-
tive agent in a general model of a production economy (see Breeden, 1979,
Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1985). Secondly, the model links consumption to
asset prices. It is therefore well adapted to studying the relationship between
the real economy and nancial markets. These characteristics have made the
C-CAPM one of the cornerstones of asset pricing (see e.g. Cochrane, 2001). To
summarize, in the C-CAPM, a rational representative agent splits her income
between consumption and savings in a risky asset in order to maximize the
utility of both her present and expected future consumption. The no-arbitrage
equation states that the utility lost in investing one unit of consumption in
an asset today must be equal to the expected utility of the additional fu-
ture consumption obtained with the assets payo¤. With this condition, the
asset price is equal to the expected future payo¤s discounted with the inter-
temporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative agent. This rate
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is a function of the marginal utility of present and future consumption and
thus, indirectly, it is a function of present and future consumption. 3 Conse-
quently, the fundamental asset price is a function of the expected present value
of future dividends and future consumption. The fundamentals variables (or
fundamentals) are thus dividends and consumption instead of dividends and
interest rates as in CAPM-based models. To my knowledge, only Campbell
and Shiller (1988b) and Lund and Engsted (1996, LE hereafter) have used the
C-CAPM to compute a fundamental stock price. 4
The model presented here di¤ers from CS and LE in several ways: rstly, I
compute three alternative fundamental models, one with stable ination, an-
other in which ination is characterized by structural breaks and a last one in
which agents are subject to money illusion. The latter two models are used to
study the e¤ects of the signicant reduction in ination observed in the eight-
ies on fundamental stock prices. Both models are a plausible explanation for
the general increase in PD ratios observed in the four countries studied in this
paper. In the rst one, low ination is associated with low interest rates and
less uncertainty in the economy, which should induce higher stock prices. In the
second one, money illusion prompts agents to use nominal variables instead of
real ones, and thus a decrease in ination generates a decrease in nominal dis-
count rates, which increases stock prices. Several authors have documented the
negative correlation between ination and stock prices. However, the channel
by which ination inuences stock prices is still subject to debate. Recently,
several authors have attributed it to money illusion (Ritter and Warr, 2002,
Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004, Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2005). I nd
that money illusion seems to play a signicant role in the United States and,
to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom, whereas it is less relevant for Japan
and Switzerland.
Secondly, the fundamental price developed in this paper is based on a second-
order Taylor approximation of the no-arbitrage condition. CS and LE stop
at the rst-order approximation. With an additional order of approximation
the fundamental price becomes a function of the rst and second moments of
dividends and consumption, including their covariance. I estimate these second
moments with a multivariate GARCH model. The advantage of this approach
is to capture the impact of time-varying covariances on the fundamental price.
This is new in the context of fundamental stock prices. Note that the second-
order approximation presented in this paper is not restricted to the C-CAPM
3 The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution also depends on the form of the
utility function and thus on the risk aversion of the representative agent.
4 Shiller (2005) also presents a fundamental price based on the C-CAPM. However,
his computation is based on ex-post dividends and consumption growth rate and
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is not estimated but arbitrarily set equal to
3.
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framework and can be used to compute the fundamental price derived from
any other SDF model.
Thirdly, in each step of the computation of the fundamental price for time t,
I have been particularly careful to use only the information available at that
time. Thus, I put myself in the same position as an investor, who computes
the fundamental price at time t. As a result, the fundamental price estimated
here is a true ex-ante price. CS and LE compute an ex-post price by using the
whole sample to estimate the fundamentalsdynamic.
Finally, I assess the out-of-sample accuracy of forecasts based on the fun-
damental price and compare it with other simpler fundamental models. The
ability of simple fundamental models to forecast future prices in the long term
is now well documented. Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001) or Rapach and
Wohar (2005), for example, show that price-dividends (PD) ratios can help
to forecast stock price movements (in-sample) for horizons of 6 to 10 years.
Recently, Rapach and Wohar (2006) bring evidence that this result also holds
out-of-sample. One of the main results of this paper is to show that the C-
CAPM fundamental price is able to improve out-of-sample forecasts even for
horizons shorter than 6 years. The improvement is particularly spectacular for
the United Kingdom, where the fundamental model performs at least 20% bet-
ter 5 than the random walk with drift for all horizons longer than one year! No
other simpler fundamental model tested in this paper is able to systematically
outperform the forecasts of the C-CAPM model. In addition, I show that, in
the United States, in the United Kingdom and in Switzerland, the accuracy
of the C-CAPM fundamental model increases when the price is far from its
empirical value. This suggests that the tendency of the price to move back
toward its fundamental value is stronger when the misalignment is large. The
fact that the C-CAPM fundamental price is able to give out-of-sample fore-
casts is a sign that there is a link between market price and the fundamental
price.
The paper is structured as follow: Section 2 presents the fundamental price
equation and the transformations that are necessary to estimate it. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 documents the long term evolution of PD
ratios and introduces the di¤erent ination models used in this paper. Sec-
tion 5 describes the econometric methodology used to estimate the di¤erent
coe¢ cients of the fundamental equation. Section 6 presents the estimated fun-
damental prices. Section 7 checks whether prices eventually go back to their
fundamental value and assesses the forecasting performance of the fundamen-
tal model. Section 8 assesses the value added of the C-CAPM fundamental
model developed in this paper. Section 9 concludes.
5 Accuracy is measured in terms of mean absolute error.
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2 The fundamental stock price equation
The fundamental stock price is based on the no-arbitrage equation derived
from the C-CAPM (Section 2.1). From this equation, I express the funda-
mental price as the present value of expected future fundamentals, which are
the dividends and the expected marginal utility of consumption (Section 2.2).
Section 2.3 shows how to linearize the fundamental equation and to express
the fundamental price as a linear function of expected fundamentals. Section
2.4 explains how to compute the expectations regarding fundamentals. Fi-
nally, Section 2.5 combines these elements to give the nal equation for the
fundamental price.
2.1 The C-CAPM no-arbitrage equation
The rst step for computing the fundamental price of stocks is to choose the
fundamental model for the market. In this paper, I dene the fundamental
price as follows
Denition 1 At time t, the fundamental price of an asset is the equilibrium
price resulting from the optimal choice made by a rational representative agent
who allocates her income between consumption and savings (in the asset) in
order to maximize the utility of her present and expected future real consump-
tion.
This denition corresponds to the maximization problem at the center of the
C-CAPM (Lucas, 1978, Breeden, 1979). The Euler equation given by the rst
order condition of this maximization problem is
Pt = Et [Mt+1 (Pt+1 +Dt+1)] (1)
with
Mt+1 = 
U 0 (Ct+1)
U 0 (Ct)
(2)
where Pt is the stock price at time t, Dt+1 is the dividend paid by the stock
at the end of period t,  is the subjective discount factor of the representative
agent and U 0 (Ct) is the marginal utility of consumption Ct in period t. Mt+1
is called the stochastic discount factor (SDF). This equation is a no-arbitrage
equation which states that the utility lost by reducing consumption of one
unit in period t and investing it in the stock is equal to the discounted and
expected increase in utility obtained from the extra payo¤ at time t+ 1.
To be able to compute SDF, I assume the following:
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Assumption 1 The representative agent has a power utility function
With a power utility function, the SDF is
Mt+1 = 

Ct+1
Ct
 
(3)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the representative agent.
Of course, many other utility functions are possible (e.g. exponential util-
ity, habit formation, prospect utility, etc...). In particular, utility functions
with time-varying risk aversion have attracted a lot of attention in the recent
literature. 6 Their success is mainly due to their ability to capture cyclical
variation in the SDF. However, the goal of this paper is to estimate the long-
term fundamental value of stock prices rather than explaining their short-term
variations. In that sense, the constant relative risk aversion implied by power
utility is "inherently attractive and is required to explain the stability of nan-
cial variables in the face of secular economic growth" (Campbell and Viceira,
2002, p.25). However, if there is a need to use another utility function, the
methodology proposed here can easily be adapted by replacing the SDF with
the appropriate expression. 7 The only requirement is that the utility function
should give a log SDF which is a linear function of observable variables. Habit
formation functions or loss aversion functions, for example, have an SDF that
ts into this framework (cf. Monnin, 2008).
2.2 Fundamental present value equation
By forward iteration of the future price in the no-arbitrage equation (1), the
fundamental price can be expressed as 8
Pt = Et
1X
i=1
0@ iY
j=1
Mt+j
1ADt+i (4)
This equation simply tells us that the fundamental asset price in period t is
equal to the expected present value of future dividends paid by the asset. The
discount factor Mt+i used to compute the present value is a function of the
6 For example, habit formation models initiated by Constantinides (1990) or Camp-
bell and Cochrane (1999) have been used extensively to empirically study time-
varying risk aversion.
7 Most asset pricing models can be expressed in the SDF model. They di¤er only
in terms of the form taken by Mt+1 (cf. Cochrane, 2001).
8 Formally, the transversality condition limi!1Et
hQi
j=1Mt+j

Pt+i
i
= 0 is im-
posed to obtain equation (4). This condition rules out bubbles in the innite horizon.
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expected marginal utilities of future consumption. Thus, the two fundamental
variables driving the fundamental asset price are dividends and consumption.
Since prices and dividends are not stationary, it is convenient, for empirical
purposes, to express the present value in equation (4) in terms of stationary
variables. For that, as suggested by Cochrane (1992), we divide both sides by
Dt to get
PDt = Et
1X
i=1
iY
j=1
Mt+jt+j (5)
where PDt = Pt=Dt is the price dividend ratio (PD ratio) at time t and
t = Dt=Dt 1 is the gross growth rate of dividends between t and t  1.
2.3 Linearization
The right-hand side of equation (5) is clearly non-linear, which is not conve-
nient for empirical estimations. To overcome with this problem, it is possible
to linearize the fundamental price by taking the logarithm of equation (5)
and by using a second-order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of this
equation around its mean. This yields (see proof in Appendix A.1)
pdt = Et (pd

t ) +
1
2
Vt (pd

t ) +Rt (6)
where pdt = lnPDt and pdt = lnPD

t with PD

t =
P1
i=1
Qi
j=1Mt+jt+j being
the PD ratio with all future fundamentals known with certainty (i.e. the PD
ratio with perfect forecasts). Rt is the remainder of the Taylor expansion,
which is a function of third and higher expected moments of pdt .
Note that, by denition, PDt is equal to
PDt =Mt+1t+1

1 + PDt+1

(7)
Taking the logarithm of this equation yields
pdt = mt+1 +dt+1 + ln

1 + PDt+1

(8)
where mt+1 = lnMt+1, dt+1 = dt+1   dt and dt = lnDt. This expression can
be linearized with a rst-order Taylor approximation. As shown by Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), the last term of equation (8) can be approximated
by (cf. Appendix A.2)
ln

1 + PDt+1

' + pdt+1 (9)
where  = 1=

1 + exp

 pdt

and  =   ln   (1  ) ln (1=  1) are both
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linearization coe¢ cients and pdt is the average log PD ratio observed until
time t. 9 Substituting this approximation in equation (8) gives
pdt ' +mt+1 +dt+1 + pdt+1 (10)
Finally, by substituting pdt+1 forward, we get the following linear approxima-
tion of pdt
pdt '
1X
i=1
i 1 (+mt+i +dt+i) (11)
If we now use the approximation (11) in equation (6), we nd that
pdt = Et
 1X
i=1
i 1 (mt+i +dt+i)
!
+
1
2
Vt
 1X
i=1
i 1 (mt+i +dt+i)
!
+ c0t (12)
where c0t = Rt + = (1  ). The next step is to replace the log SDF mt+i by
its denition given in equation (3) 10 and to express the fundamental log PD
ratio in vector terms to simplify notation. For that, let us dene the vector
xt =

ct dt
0
which collects all the fundamentals . Using this notation, we
can rewrite equation (12) as
pdt =
1X
i=1
i 1g0Et (xt+i) +
1
2
Vt
 1X
i=1
i 1g0xt+i
!
+ ct (13)
where g0 =

  1

and ct = Rt + (+ ln ) = (1  ). Developing the con-
ditional variance in the second term of the right-hand side of this equation
yields
pdt =
1X
i=1
i 1g0Et (xt+i) +
1
2
1X
i=1
1X
j=1
i+j 2g0Et (t+i;t+j) g + ct (14)
where t+i;t+j = "t;t+i"0t;t+j and "t;t+i = xt+i Et (xt+i) is the error of a forecast
made at time t about the fundamental xt+i. The expression Et (t+i;t+j) is the
di¤erence of the expected conditional covariance at time t between the t + i
and t+ j forecast errors. 11 Equation (14) simply states that the fundamental
log PD ratio is a linear function of expected fundamentals (dividend growth
9 Note that the linearization coe¢ cient  is time-varying since it changes each time
the observed average log PD ratio pdt changes. To keep notation simple, I did not
use a subscript for the time with , but the reader should keep in mind that  is
reestimated at each period to compute the fundamental price. The reestimation of
 is necessary to arrive at a fundamental price that is computed only on the data
observable at time t.
10Note that mt+1 = lnMt+1 = ln   ct+1 where ct+1 = ct+1   ct with ct =
lnCt.
11 In this paper, the term covariance refers both to variances and covariances.
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and consumption growth) and of their expected conditional covariances and
autocovariances.
2.4 Expectations about future fundamentals
As stated in equation (14), the fundamental log PD ratio is a function of the
representative agents expectations about fundamentals and their conditional
covariance. Therefore, to estimate the fundamental price, we have to specify
how the representative agent forms her expectation. According to Denition
1, the representative agent is rational, which implies, by denition, that she
will use all the relevant information available at time t to make her forecasts.
At time t, the relevant information set is constituted of all present and past
fundamentals xt and of all present and past variables, which have some fore-
casting power for the fundamentals (e.g. ination). The latter variables are
collected in the (p 1) vector zt. Note that zt can include the observed log
PD ratio if it helps to predict future fundamentals. Additionally, we assume
the following:
Assumption 2 The representative agent forms her expectations about future
fundamentals in two steps. In the rst step, she estimates the dynamic of the
variables in her information set with a VAR model, in which the conditional
covariance is modeled with a multivariate GARCH. In the second step, she
uses the estimated VAR-GARCH to forecast future fundamentals and their
conditional covariance.
The VAR part of the model is used to forecast the rst part of the right-
hand side of equation (14) (future fundamentals). The GARCH part estimates
the dynamic of the conditional covariance, which is then used to forecast
the second part of the right-hand side of equation (14) (future conditional
covariance). Concretely, assumption 2 implies that the representative agent
uses the following model to make her forecasts about future fundamentals:
yt = A0 + A1yt 1 + :::+ Ajyt j + "t (15)
"t  N (0; Ht) (16)
where yt =

xt zt
0
is a vector collecting present and past observations (until
lag j), Ai are matrices of coe¢ cients 12 estimated at time t and "t is an error
12 The coe¢ cient matrices are time-varying since a rational agent updates her es-
timation with each new observation. To simplify the notation, I did not use any
subscript for t. The reader should, however, bear in mind that a di¤erent VAR-
GARCH is estimated for each period using only the information available at that
time.
12
term, which is normally distributed with a time-varying covariance matrix
Ht. Assumption 2 also species that the covariance matrix Ht is modelled as
a multivariate GARCH. The multivariate GARCH is a generalization of the
univariate GARCH which estimates time-varying covariances in addition to
time-varying variances. A general formulation of the multivariate GARCH is
the vech model of Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge (1988), which has the
following specication
ht = K +Bht 1 + Cet 1 (17)
et = ht + ut (18)
where ht =vechfHtg, et =vechf"t"0tg where the vech operator converts the
lower triangle of a symmetric matrix into a vector. The matrices K, B and
C are matrices of coe¢ cients 13 and ut is an error term which is normally
distributed with a constant covariance matrix 
. In this model, the covariance
matrix is a linear function of its last past values and of last past residuals. 14
For greater clarity, it is useful to express this VAR-GARCH model as its
companion form
yt = Ayt 1 + et (19)
ht = Bht 1 + ut (20)
where
yt=

yt yt 1 ::: yt j+1 1
0
ht =

ht et 1
0
et =

"t 0 ::: 0
0
ut =

0 ut 0
0
A =
26666666666664
A1    Aj 1 Aj A0
1    0 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0    1 0 0
0    0 0 1
37777777777775
B =
2666664
B C K
B C K
0 0 1
3777775
If the representative agent uses this VAR-GARCH model to make her fore-
casts, her expectation about yt+i and Ht+i will be
Et (yt+i) = A
iyt (21)
13 The coe¢ cient matrices are time-varying (cf. footnote 12).
14 In the original vech model, the correlation matrix can be a function of more
than one lag (and of other exogeneous variables). For simplicity, however, and also
because it will be formally expressed in assumption 5, I restrict the model to one
lag (with no exogeneous variables).
13
Et (Ht+i) = vech
 1 nBihto (22)
where the operator vech 1 converts a vector into the lower triangle of a sym-
metric matrix.
Finally, before using these expectations in the fundamental equation (14), it
is useful to dene Ht+i = et+ie0t+i. We nd that
Et (Ht+i) = Et

et+ie
0
t+i

=
2666666664
Et (Ht+i) 0 : : : 0
0 0 : : : 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 : : : 0
3777777775
=
= qvech 1
n
Biht
o
q0 (23)
where q0 =

I2+p 0(2+p)(2+p)(j 1)

.
2.5 Fundamental PD ratio
Once the expectations have been dened, it is possible to derive the funda-
mental log PD ratio as a function of the estimated VAR-GARCH and of the
observable variables. For that, let us rewrite equation (14) with the new no-
tation:
pdt =
1X
i=1
i 1g0Et (yt+i) +
1
2
1X
i=1
1X
j=1
i+j 2g0Et (t+i;t+j)g + c (24)
where g0 =

g 0(2+p)(j 1)+p

andt+i;t+j = et;t+ie0t;t+j with et;t+i =

"t;t+i 0 ::: 0
0
.
The vector g0 is a row vector which selects xt in yt and multiplies it by the
vector g. 15
Let us rst consider the second part of the right-hand side of equation (24).
Using the fact that yt+1 = Atyt+et+1, we can express the error made at time
t about the vector yt+i as a function of one-period shocks
et;t+i =
iX
k=1
Ai ket+k (25)
15Note that, given assumption 2, expected third and higher moments are constant.
Therefore, the remainder Rt of the Taylor expansion, and thus ct, are also constant.
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Plugging that into t+i;t+j yields
t+i;t+j =
iX
k=1
jX
l=1
Ai kt Et

et+ke
0
t+l

(A0t)
j l (26)
Using this expression and the fact that the error terms are not autocorre-
lated, 16 we can rewrite equation (24) as
pdt=
1X
i=1
i 1g0Et (yt+i) +
+
1
2
1X
i=1
i 1g0 (I  A) 1Et (Ht+i) (I  A0) 1 g + c (27)
We can integrate the expectation derived in equations (21) and (23) into our
fundamental equation to arrive at
pdt=
1X
i=1
i 1g0Aiyt +
+
1
2
1X
i=1
i 1g0 (I  A) 1 qvech 1
n
Biht
o
q0 (I  A0) 1 g + c (28)
Finally, using the fact that the vech 1 operator has the following properties
avech 1 (x) = vech 1 (ax) (29)
vech 1 (x) + vech 1 (y) = vech 1 (x+ y) (30)
we obtain the last fundamental equation
pdt=g
0 (I  A) 1Ayt +
+
1
2
g0 (I  A) 1 qvech 1
n
(I  B) 1Bht
o
q0 (I  A0) 1 g+
+c (31)
Equation (31) expresses the fundamental log PD ratio as a function of 1) the
observable variables in yt, 2) the estimated covariance matrix in ht, 3) the
estimated VAR-GARCH dynamic in A and B, 4) the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion  in g and 5) the linearization parameter . The next sections
present the empirical estimation of this fundamental equation.
16 Cf. equation (16).
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3 Data
The next assumption concerns the set of variables yt that is used to forecast
future fundamentals (i.e. future consumption and dividends).
Assumption 3 The representative agent uses past and present fundamentals
(i.e. consumption and dividends) and ination rates to forecast future funda-
mentals.
Following assumption 3, the data set contains stock prices, dividends, con-
sumption and consumer price data for four countries: United States, United
Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland. All series are monthly. Stock prices are
measured by the S&P 500 index for United States, the FTSE All shares in-
dex for Untied Kingdom and the MSCI indexes for Japan and Switzerland.
Monthly data are obtained by taking the monthly average of daily prices.
Dividends are computed with the dividend yield data supplied for each stock
price index. Consumption is measured by personal consumption expenditures
in the United States and by the households consumption expenditure for
the other countries. Consumption data for the United Kingdom, Japan and
Switzerland are quarterly. They have been converted to monthly data by us-
ing the Eviews cubic spline conversion method. 17 Whenever necessary, real
values are obtained by dividing nominal data by the Consumer Price Index of
each country. The samples extend from January 1965 through to January 2007
for the United States and the United Kingdom, from January 1970 through
to January 2007 for Japan and from March 1970 through to January 2007
for Switzerland. All data stem from Datastream except consumption data for
Japan and Switzerland, which stem from the IMF database and the Swiss
National Bank database respectively. Figure 1 displays the log nominal stock
price indexes and the log PD ratios. Figure 2 shows the log nominal consump-
tion and the log nominal dividends. Finally, Figure 3 gives the log consumer
price levels.
4 Long-term evolution of PD ratios and of ination
PD ratios in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland
share a striking feature: they all increased signicantly during the observation
period (cf. Figure 4). The visual impression given by Figure 4 is formally
conrmed by structural break tests. Table 1 gives the results of the supF
17 This method assigns each value in the low frequency series to the last high fre-
quency observation associated with the low frequency period, then places all inter-
mediate points on a natural cubic spline connecting all the points.
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Fig. 1. Stock prices and PD ratios
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Price indexes: S&P 500 for the Untied States, FTSE All shares for the United Kingdom, MSCI for Japan and Switzerland. Divi-
dends are computed with the dividend yield associated with each of these indexes. Prices are nominal. Both variables are expressed
in logarithm. Source: Datastream.
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Fig. 2. Consumption and dividends
United States - Consumption
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States - Dividends
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United Kingdom - Consumption
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United Kingdom - Dividends
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Japan - Consumption
7.6
8.0
8.4
8.8
9.2
9.6
10.0
10.4
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Japan - Dividends
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland - Consumption
8.0
8.4
8.8
9.2
9.6
10.0
10.4
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland - Dividends
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Consumption: personal consumption expenditures for the United States and households' final consumption for the United Kingdom,
Japan and Switzerland. Dividends are computed with the dividend yield associated with each stock price index. Both variables are
nominal and expressed in logarithm. Source: Datastream, IMF and Swiss national bank.
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Fig. 3. Consumer price indexes
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Consumer price indexes are expressed in logarithm. Source: Datastream.
structural break test developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a) for the log
PD ratio in the di¤erent countries. This test assesses the probability of a
structural break in the average PD ratio and estimates its most probable
date. The Bai and Perrons supF statistics clearly detect a structural break in
PD ratios for each country. These breaks occured in the rst half of the 1990s
in the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland and around 1983
in Japan. In all countries, the average PD ratio increases signicantly after
the break.
The four countries studied in this paper share another characteristic: they all
experienced a signicant decline in ination in the 1980s. This decline could
be an explanation for the higher PD ratio. Several studies show that the yield
on stocks is linked to the yield on nominal Treasury bonds. This link is the
center of the so-called "Fed model", which is quite successful in empirically
describing stock prices. Historically, the main inuence on the nominal bond
yield is ination. Thus, ination should have an indirect impact on stock prices
through its inuence on nominal bond yields. Indeed, in our sample, the long-
term evolution of the PD ratio is strikingly similar to that of ination rates
(cf. Figure 4).
The literature usually distinguishes three channels through which ination
can inuence PD ratios. First, ination and the response of monetary policy
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Fig. 4. Long-term evolution of PD ratios and of ination
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Each panel gives the 10 – year moving average of the PD ratio and the inflation (solid and dashed line, respectively). Both vari-
ables are standardized.
to it can damage the real economy. This can impair the protability of rms
and thus reduce dividends. In that case, a fall in ination is benecial to
the rms, which can then distribute more dividends, driving up PD ratios.
Second, higher ination can induce more uncertainty in the economy, leading
to higher risk premiums. In this second case, the lower ination observed since
the eighties is associated with lower risk premiums and thus higher PD ratios.
Finally, a third, and more radical, possibility could be that investors fail to
understand the e¤ect of ination on nominal variables. This phenomenon is
called money illusion (or ination illusion). Fisher (1928) gives the following
denition for money illusion: 18
"[Money illusion] is the failure to perceive that the dollar, or any other unit
of money, expands or shrinks in value"
If an investor su¤ers from money illusion, then she does not take ination into
account (or does so falsely). One consequence of this is that she might value an
equity by using nominal dividends instead of real dividends (Modigliani and
Cohn, 1979). Another consequence is that she might measure her consumption
in nominal rather than in real terms. This would bias her discount factor, since
she will use a nominal discount rate instead of a real one.
18 Citation taken from Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008).
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Table 1
Structural breaks
1 break Direction
vs. Date of
0 break change
Unites Stated PD ratio 370.9814** 1995.10 +
Ination 109.7876** 1982.08 -
United Kingdom PD ratio 170.6247** 1993.09 +
Ination 82.5391** 1982.06 -
Japan PD ratio 339.9369** 1983.08 +
Ination 79.5824** 1977.05 -
Switzerland PD ratio 310.4308** 1993.01 +
Ination 92.6971** 1975.11 -
* (**) denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of 0 breaks for the alternative hypothesis of 1
break at a 5% (1% ) condence level. The critica l values for the test are given by Bai and Perron
(2003b) for a trimm ing param eter of 0 .15. The estim ated break date is g iven in the last co lumn.
The rst two channels (i.e. impact on dividend growth rates and on risk pre-
miums) are compatible with a rational investor framework. The last one (i.e.
money illusion) assumes some level of irrationality from the investors in the
sense that they fail to correctly interpret the impact of ination on the econ-
omy. In this paper, I study these two situations separately and compare them
with a situation in which ination has no structural break. Thus, in the rest
of this paper, I compare the three following models:
Model 1 (No break) Ination has an inuence on dividend growth rate and
risk premiums but does not display structural breaks
Model 2 (With breaks) Ination has an inuence on dividend growth rate
and risk premiums and does display structural breaks
Model 3 (With money illusion) Agents are subject to money illusion and use
nominal instead of real variables
The last two models imply that agents have to react to structural breaks (in
ination with model 2 and in nominal variables with model 3). To estimate how
investors integrate structural breaks in their forecasts, I make the following
assumption:
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Assumption 4 The representative agent bases her forecasts about future growth
rates of consumption, dividends or consumer prices on the average growth rate
observed in the last ve 19 years.
By taking the average growth rate over the last years instead of the average
over the whole period, the agent obtains an estimate of the long-term growth
rate which is currently driving the variables. Thus she is able to adapt her
expectation to a structural change in any of the variables. Assumption 4 does
not mean that the agent abandons the use the VAR-GARCHmodel, but rather
that she uses it to forecast deviations from the long-term average. Note that
I do not use Assumption 4 to compute the fundamental price with model 1
since variables are assumed to be stable in that case.
To take into account the impact of a structural decrease in ination on divi-
dends (on the risk premium), I regress ination on the dividend growth rate
(on the consumption growth rate) at each period and then use the coe¢ cients
obtained to estimate the impact of a change in average ination on the av-
erage dividend growth rate (consumption growth rate). Finally, to estimate
the e¤ect of money illusion, I use nominal dividend and consumption growth
rates instead of real growth rates (as an agent subject to money illusion is
assumed to do). The di¤erence between the real (with break in ination) and
the nominal model (with break in nominal variables) reects the impact of
money illusion.
5 Econometric methodology
To be able to compute the fundamental price given by equation (31), we must
know A, B,  and c. The next two sections explain how to estimate these
coe¢ cients.
5.1 Estimation of the VAR-GARCH model
The rst step of the computation of the fundamental stock price is to esti-
mate the matrices A and B of the VAR-GARCH model. This requires the
simultaneous estimation of equations (15) and (17). For the estimation of the
GARCH dynamic to remain computationally feasible, it is necessary to re-
strict the number of coe¢ cients in A and B. For that, I make the following
assumption:
19 I also estimated the fundamental prices with an average over the last 7.5 and
10 years. In the text, I present only the alternative which gives the best results in
terms of forecasts.
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Assumption 5 Each element of the conditional covariance matrix depends
only on its own last value and last residuals.
This assumption means that the GARCH dynamic is a BEKK model (Engle
and Kroner, 1995) with one lag and no exogenous variable. The BEKK model
can be estimated by maximization of the log likelihood function as explained
by Hamilton (1994, p. 670).
I estimated a VAR-GARCHmodel for each period using only the data available
at that time. With this procedure, I placed myself exactly in the same situation
as an investor living at time t. This yields a truly "out-of-sample" estimation
of the fundamental price, i.e. based only on ex-ante data. In each period I used
6 lags in the VAR part of the model. In addition to the matrices A and B,
the estimation of the VAR-GARCH also gives an estimation of the conditional
variance-covariance vector ht.
5.2 Estimation of the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
After the estimation of the matrices A and B, the only unknown remaining
in the fundamental equation (31) is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 
appearing in g. Note that, without using the matrix notation, equation (31)
is equivalent to
pdt =  q1;t + q2;t + 1
2
2q3;t   q4;t + 1
2
q5;t + c (32)
where q1;t and q2;t are the rst and second elements of (I  A) 1Ayt for A
and  estimated with the sample available at time t, and q3;t, q4;t and q5;t are
the (1,1)-th, (1,2)-th and (2,2)-th element of
(I  A) 1 qvech 1
n
(I  B) 1Bht
o
q0 (I  A0) 1 (33)
for A, B,  and ht estimated with the sample available at time t. The para-
meters  and c can then be estimated, for each period, by estimating equation
(32) with OLS and a sample containing only the variables q;t k (for all k
between 0 and t  1) available at this time.
6 Estimated fundamental stock prices
The fundamental log PD ratio can be computed with equation (31) for pa-
rameters estimated as explained in section 5. As mentioned in section 4, I
use real data for the models without money illusion and nominal data for
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the models with money illusion. The fundamental price can then be recovered
from the fundamental log PD ratio by adding dt (in real terms for the models
without money illusion and in nominal terms for the model with money illu-
sion). Figure 5 shows the estimated fundamental stock prices for the di¤erent
models described in section 4 and the observed prices (left panels) and the es-
timated fundamental and observed PD ratios (right panels). The gap between
the observed and the fundamental prices is presented in Figure 6.
In each country, we observe that the price can diverge signicantly and for
long periods from its fundamental value for all three models. The American
stock market is characterized by a huge gap at the end of the 1990s, which is
associated with the Internet bubble. According to the model with breaks in
ination and to the model with money illusion, this bubble has disappeared in
recent years. Before the bubble, and according to all models, the stock prices
were undervalued most of the time, with some short episodes of overvaluation
(e.g. in 1974 or in 1987). 20 The stock market in the United Kingdom follows
a similar pattern, with a smaller overvaluation at the end of the 1990s (and
a bigger undervaluation after the crash in 1974). Note that for this country I
do not observe a signicant di¤erence between the models with and without
breaks in ination, which suggests that no strong empirical link between in-
ation and real variables has been observed during this period. The Japanese
market saw a long period of relatively substantial overvaluation at the end of
the 1980s and at the very beginning of the 1990s. After that, the model with
money illusion di¤ers signicantly from the others. The model with money
illusion indicates that stocks were undervalued whereas the other models indi-
cate that stocks were overvalued until 2004. Finally, the Swiss market displays
a pattern similar to the United Kingdom with the exceptions that the main
overvaluation period begins earlier in the 1990s and decreases most notably
in 1998. Note that the Swiss market su¤ered from the 1998 crisis (Russian/
LTCM crisis) more than other western countries. July 1998 remained the his-
torical peak until the beginning of 2006 in Switzerland, whereas stock prices
recovered much more rapidly in other western countries. 21
The volatility of the observed price is signicantly greater than the volatility of
20 Zhong, Darrat, and Anderson (2003) and Black, Fraser, and Groenewold (2003b)
nd a similar period of undervaluation between the second half of the 1970s and the
rst half of the 1990s. The former use ex-post data for a sample ranging from 1871
through to 1997 (as in Shiller, 1981); the latter use a general equilibrium framework
with samples ranging from 1947 through to 2002 for quarterly data and from 1929
through to 2001 for annual data.
21More precisely, for the Swiss market, the record high of 21 July 1998 (1931.49)
was beaten for one day (23 August 2000) before plunging until the beginning of
2003. On the other hand, the stock price index returned to its level of July 1998
only ve months later in the United States and ten months later in the United
Kingdom.
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Fig. 5. Fundamental stock prices and fundamental PD ratios
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The black line is the observed stock price. The grey line is the estimated fundamental stock price without break. The black dashed
line is the estimated fundamental stock price with breaks in inflation. The grey dashed line is the estimated fundamental stock price
with money illusion. All variables are expressed in logarithm.
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Fig. 6. Gap between the observed and the fundamental prices
United States
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United Kingdom
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Japan
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Each panel presents the difference between the (log) observed nominal stock price and the estimated (log) fundamental stock price
without break (grey line), with break in inflation (black line) and with money illusion (dashed line). For the United Kingdom, the
gap for the model with break in inflation is not represented because it is almost similar to the model without break.
the fundamental price without structural breaks in all countries. This is in-line
with the stock price volatility puzzle (Shiller, 1981, LeRoy and Porter, 1981).
The volatility of the observed price is also signicantly greater than the volatil-
ity of the fundamental price with breaks in ination in all countries. Finally,
the volatility of the stock price is signicantly greater than the fundamental
stock price with money illusion in the United States and in Switzerland. In
the United Kingdom, this volatility is also greater but the di¤erence is not
signicant. In Japan, the volatility of the stock price is smaller than that of
the fundamental price with money illusion.
7 Do stock prices go back to their fundamental value?
As shown in the previous section, prices can diverge signicantly from their
fundamental value for long periods. This conclusion naturally raises the ques-
tion of the existence (or absence) of a link between observed and fundamental
prices. I study this question from two points of view. Firstly, I examine the
dynamic of the gaps and determine whether they tend to disappear after a
certain time. Secondly, I seek to establish whether the fundamental price can
help in forecasting future prices out-of-sample. If the fundamental price yields
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good out-of-sample forecasts, then it is a sign that there is a link between
them. The rst approach is in-sample and the second is out-of-sample.
7.1 Gap dynamic analysis
Firstly, I test for the presence of a unit root in the gap between the observed
and the fundamental prices. If the unit root is rejected, then the gap is mean
reverting, which means that it tends to disappear after some time and that
the observed price eventually goes back to its fundamental value. 22
Table 2 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the
Phillips-Perron test for unit root. For the United States, a unit root cannot
be rejected at a 5% condence level for the models with and without breaks
in ination. The results are less clear for the model with money illusion. In
the United Kingdom, the unit root is rejected for all models. In Japan, the
unit root cannot be rejected for the model with breaks in ination and for the
model with money illusion. Results are less clear for the model without break.
Finally, in Switzerland, the unit root is strongly rejected for the models with
breaks and with money illusion. These results suggest that, rstly, there is no
clear link between the observed price and the model with or without breaks in
the United States, nor between the model with breaks or with money illusion
in Japan. Secondly, the gap for all models in the UK and for the models with
breaks or money illusion model in Switzerland are mean reverting, indicating
a link between these fundamental prices and the observed prices.
In complement to the unit root tests, I estimate the impulse-response function
of the di¤erent gaps. The results are presented in Figure 7. Each impulse-
response function indicates how the gap evolves after a shock. All functions
show that the gap generated by a random shock tends to disappear after
some time but at very di¤erent speeds. In the United States and the United
Kingdom, the gap vanishes more quickly for the model with money illusion. In
Japan, the gap disappears the fastest in the case of the model without break.
In Switzerland, this holds for the model with breaks in ination. The half-
life 23 of the fastest-vanishing gap is one year and two months in the United
Kingdom and one year in Switzerland against about 2.5 years in Japan and
more than 4 years in the United States for the model with money illusion.
This is a sign that there is a link between the observed and the fundamental
22 This approach is equivalent to testing for cointegration between the fundamental
and the observed prices. In our case, the cointegrating vector is known a priori and
is equal to
h
1  1
i
.
23 The half-life corresponds to the number of months needed for the gap to wipe out
half of the initial shock.
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Fig. 7. Impulse-response function for the gaps
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Impulse-Response functions for the gaps between the observed and the fundamental prices (expressed in months, horizontal axis).
The solid line corresponds to the fundamental model without break, the doted line to the fundamental model with break in inflation
and the dashed line to the fundamental model with money illusion.
prices, but that this link is weak and that it takes time for the gap to die out
after a shock. This suggests that the C-CAPM fundamental price does play a
role in the long-term evolution of the stock price, but that it performs rather
poorly in explaining the short-term dynamic of the stock price.
7.2 Forecast accuracy analysis
This section analyses the ability of the information contained in the funda-
mental price to forecast future stock prices. Apart from its obvious practical
applications, the forecast ability of the fundamental price is another way to
study the link between the price and its fundamental value. If the fundamental
price is able to give good out-of-sample forecasts, then it is a sign that there
is a link between them. I compare two forecasting models:
(1) Random walk with drift (benchmark model): for this model, I rst
estimate the growth rate of the observed price on the observable sample
at time t. Then, I use the estimated growth rate to forecast the future
price for di¤erent horizon starting at the price observed at time t.
(2) Fundamental random walk with drift: similarly to the benchmark
model, I rst estimate the growth rate of the fundamental price on the
29
observable sample at time t. Then, I use the estimated growth rate to
forecast the future fundamental price for di¤erent horizon starting at the
fundamental price at time t. I set the forecast for the future price equal
to the forecast for the fundamental price. 24
The last model has been tested with the fundamental price given by the three
models described in section 4. Note that, in addition to these models, I have
also estimated models in which the observed price or the fundamental price is
a random walk or an AR(1) process. However, their forecasts are constantly
outperformed by those of the random walk with drift models. 25 Their re-
sults are therefore not presented here. Finally, remember that all forecasts are
made out-of-sample. The forecast accuracy is measured by the mean absolute
error. 26
Figure 8 compares the forecast accuracy of the di¤erent fundamental models
with the benchmark for di¤erent forecast horizons (horizontal axis). A value
below one indicates that the model is more accurate than the benchmark.
In the United States, the fundamental price with money illusion signicantly
improves forecast accuracy for forecast horizons longer than 2 years. For a
horizon of 6 years, the improvement is of 40%. The model with break in
ination also improves forecasts but only for horizons longer that 3.5 years.
It is, however, always outperformed by the model with money illusion for a
horizon shorter than 5 years and has about the same accuracy thereafter. For
the United Kingdom, all models improve forecast accuracy. Models without
money illusion 27 give the better forecasts for horizons longer than 3 years
with an improvement of about 40% in comparison with the benchmark. The
model with money illusion gives better forecasts for horizons shorter than 3
years. For Japan, the model with breaks also improves forecasts for horizons
longer than 5 years. Its performance is, however, less impressive than for the
24 I also used two additional forecasting techniques: one in which I estimate the
gap dynamic and combine it with the fundamental random walk model, and one in
which I try to predict the error made by the fundamental model with the actual
value of the gap (error correction model). For long-term forecasts, both techniques
are outperformed by the fundamental random walk with drift model. They beat the
latter model for short and medium-term forecasts, but are usually outperformed by
(or are close to) the random walk model with drift.
25 The only exception is Japan, for which the random walk and the AR(1) forecasts
were slightly better than the random walk with drift for both the observed and
the fundamental price. However, using them as the benchmark does not change the
results presented in the next sections.
26Using the root mean square error to measure the forecast accuracy does not
change the results.
27Note that the models with and without breaks in ination are almost similar for
the United Kingdom.
30
Fig. 8. Forecast accuracy of fundamental models
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Each panel compares the forecast accuracy of different models with the forecast accuracy of the random walk with drift model
(benchmark). The black line corresponds to the fundamental model without break, the doted line to the model with break in
inflation and the dashed line to the model with money illusion. Each panel gives the ratio of the model's average absolute errors
over the benchmark's average absolute error. A value under 1 indicates that the model is more accurate than the benchmark. The
comparison is made for different forecasting horizon (in months, horizontal axis).
United States and the United Kingdom, with a maximum improvement of
about 15% for an 6-year forecast horizon. For Switzerland, the fundamental
model with breaks is more accurate than the benchmark for horizons longer
than 4 years. The improvement is of 20% after 6 years. 28
These results tend to conrm the presence of a relatively strong link between
the fundamental and the observed stock prices in all countries. However, the
most accurate model di¤ers from one country to the other. The model with
money illusion is the best in the United States (for horizons longer than 2
years) and in the United Kingdom (for horizons between 8 months and 3
years). The model with breaks in ination is the most accurate in the United
Kingdom (for horizons longer than 3 years), in Japan (for horizons longer than
5 years) and in Switzerland (for horizon longers than 4 years).
28 Lioui and Rangvid (2007) also nd that PD ratios combined with ination level
give better forecasts than simple PD ratios for short horizons.
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8 Is it really worth computing the CAPM fundamental price?
The goal of this section is to establish whether the e¤orts made in constructing
the C-CAPM fundamental price are really worthwhile or whether computa-
tionally less intensive fundamental models give similar results. For this, I rst
decompose the fundamental price to see which component is of signicant im-
portance to the fundamental price. Secondly, I compare the forecasts of simpler
models to see if they outperform the C-CAPM in terms of forecast accuracy.
Finally, I analyze the fundamental forecasts at di¤erent points in time to see
if the C-CAPM fundamental price is more relevant in certain periods than in
others.
8.1 Fundamental price decomposition
In this section, I decompose the fundamental price into the main innovations
that have been added by this paper to the original method of Campbell and
Shiller (1988b). The goal is to see which components really change the results.
For that, I rst estimate a fundamental price without money illusion, without
breaks, without second moments and over all samples, as in Campbell and
Shiller (1988b). Secondly, I estimate the same model but by using, at each
point in time, only the information that was available at that time (out-of-
sample estimation). Thirdly, I add the estimated conditional second moments.
Finally, I introduce breaks in ination and money illusion. Table 3 presents
the fraction of the absolute deviation from the mean which is explained by
the di¤erent components. 29
The rst observation is that, in each country, the in-sample estimated funda-
mental PD ratio without money illusion does not di¤er much from the average
PD ratio (i.e. it is almost a at line). With the possible exception of Switzer-
land, introducing out-of-sample estimation does not make the t of the model
much better. Second moments do not help to make the t of the model better
either (except for Japan). Introducing breaks in ination signicantly increases
the t of the model for the United States and Switzerland. Finally, introducing
money illusion signicantly increases the t for all countries but Switzerland.
Note, however, that having a better t does not necessarily imply better fore-
casts. In Japan, for example, the model with money illusion has a better t
29 This coe¢ cient is computed by 1 P jpdt   pdt j =Ppdt   pdt where pdt is the
observed log PD ratio, pdt its average and pd

t the estimated fundamental PD ratio.
This coe¢ cient is a measure of the t of a model. A coe¢ cent equal to 0% means
that the model has the same t as the mean. A coe¢ cient of 100% means that the
model ts the observed dynamic perfectly. This coe¢ cient is similar to the coe¢ cient
of determination R2 but places less weight on extreme observations.
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Table 3
Percenage of absolute deviation from the mean explained by the fundamental model
Sample In Out Out Out Out
Moments 1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order
Break No No No Yes Yes
Money illusion No No No No Yes
United States 0.96% 5.26% 5.27% 25.91% 45.81%
United Kingdom 1.77% 1.82% 1.91% 1.93% 28.45%
Japan 3.94% 4.20% 14.91% 8.78% 31.63%
Switzerland -0.44% 7.36% 7.36% 42.43% 28.17%
than the one with breaks in ination but the latter gives better forecasts.
8.2 Forecasts with alternative fundamental models
This section compares the forecast accuracy of the C-CAPM fundamental price
developed in this paper with simpler ad-hoc fundamental models. I compare
the C-CAPM model with three simpler models:
(1) Trend model: in this model, the fundamental price is determined by
tting a linear trend with the observed prices.
(2) Hodrick-Prescott lter model: in this model the fundamental price
is determined by estimating a Hodrick-Prescott lter with the observed
price. 30
(3) Moving average PD ratio: in this model, the fundamental price is
determined by the 10-year moving average of the PD ratio.
At every period, each fundamental price is estimated with the data available
at that time. I chose to compare the forecasts of the alternative fundamental
models with the ones of the fundamental model with money illusion for the US
and with breaks in ination for the UK, Japan and Switzerland (cf. section
7.2). The alternative fundamental models correspond to measures that are
commonly used by practitioners to estimate imbalances on stock markets. For
30 The smoothing parameter is set to 230,400, which corresponds to the hypothesis
of an average gap of 20% between the fundamental and the observed price and an
average annual change of 4% in the long-term stock price trend.
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Fig. 9. Forecast accuracy of alternative fundamental models
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Each panel compares the forecast accuracy of different fundamental models with the forecast accuracy of the random walk with
drift model (benchmark). The black line corresponds to the C-CAPM model, the doted line to the trend model, the dashed line to the
Hodrick-Prescott filter model and the dot-dashed line to the moving average PD ratio model. Each panel presents the ratio of the
model's average absolute errors over the benchmark's average absolute error. A value under 1 indicates that the model is more
accurate than the benchmark. The comparison is made for different forecasting horizon (in months, horizontal axis). The C-CAPM
model with money illusion is used for the US. The C-CAPM without break in inflation is used for the UK, Japan and Switzerland.
example, Borio and Lowe (2002) use the Hodrick-Prescott lter to identify
bubbles in di¤erent stock markets. A constant PD ratio corresponds to the
Gordon (1962) model. The moving average PD ratio can thus be considered
as a Gordon model based on the recent observed dynamic.
Figure 9 shows the forecast accuracy of the alternative fundamental models.
None of the alternative models can simultaneously outperform the benchmark
or the C-CAPM fundamental model. This means that when the C-CAPM
is more accurate than the benchmark, it is also more accurate than simpler
fundamental models. Thus the C-CAPM fundamental model developed in this
paper adds some value to simpler ad-hoc fundamental models.
8.3 When are the fundamental forecasts the most accurate?
The previous sections examine the forecast accuracy of C-CAPM for the whole
sample. However, it might happen that this model performs better in some
periods than in others. This section addresses this question and, more par-
ticularly, the question of whether there is a link between the wideness of the
34
Table 4
Correlation between absolute gaps and forecast errors
Forecast horizon 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
United States -0.3114* -0.0080 0.1655* 0.2666* 0.4623*
United Kingdom -0.1486* 0.1830* 0.4653* 0.5793* 0.6162*
Japan -0.5719* -0.1851* 0.0742 0.2845* 0.3582*
Switzerland -0.2879* -0.0821 -0.0637 -0.0531 0.1018*
* denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of a co e¢ cient equal to 0 at a 5% condence level. The
correlation is m easured w ith the Sp earman co e¢ cient. A positive value m eans that a (p ositive or negative)
w ider gap implies an increase in the accuracy of the fundamental forecasts in comparison to the forecasts
based on the observed price. I use the fundamental m odel w ith money illusion for the United States and
the one w ith breaks in ination for the other countries.
gap between the fundamental and the observed prices and the precision of the
forecasts.
Table 4 gives the relation between the wideness of the gap and the forecast
error. It presents the Spearman correlation 31 between the absolute value of the
gap and the forecast accuracy improvement made by using the fundamental
model. 32 A positive correlation implies that a (positive or negative) wider
gap increases the accuracy of fundamental forecasts in comparison to forecast
based on the observed price.
The correlation analysis shows that in all countries, for horizons longer than 3
years in the US, 2 years in the UK, 4 years in Japan and 5 years in Switzerland,
a wider gap implies more accurate forecasts for the fundamental model (with
money illusion for the US and with breaks in ination for the others). Since
more accurate forecasts are a sign of a stronger link between the fundamental
and the observed price, the positive correlation suggests that the further apart
the two prices are, the more they tend to return towards each other in the
long term. In other terms, the "attraction force" exerted by the fundamental
price on the observed price become stronger as the distance between them
increases. We can also see that the strength of the link increases with the
forecast horizon.
Building on these conclusions, one could adopt the following strategy: if the
31 Since the form of the function linking the (absolute) gap with the forecast error is
a priori not known, I prefer to use the Spearman rank-order correlation coe¢ cient
rather than the traditional (linear) correlation (Pearson coe¢ cient). The Spearman
correlation coe¢ cient is independent of the form taken by the function. The Spear-
man rank-order correlation coe¢ cient measures the linear correlation between the
ranks of each observation.
32 This variable takes a positive value when the fundamental price forecasts are
better than the observed price forecasts, and a negative value when they are worse.
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Fig. 10. Forecast accuracy for periods with large gaps
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Each panel compares the forecast accuracy of the random walk with drift model to the forecast accuracy of the fundamental
random walk with drift model for forecasts made on the whole sample (grey line), for forecasts made when the (absolute) value of
the gap is greater than its median (doted line), than its 25 percentile (dashed line) and than its 10 percentile (dashed-dotted line).
Each panel presents the ratio of the model's average absolute errors over the benchmark's average absolute error. A value under 1
indicates that the model is more accurate than the benchmark. The comparison is made for different forecasting horizon (in
months, horizontal axis). The C-CAPM model with money illusion is used for the United States. The C-CAPM with breaks in
inflation is used for the United Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland.
gap is large, then one should use the fundamental price to make forecasts,
otherwise the observed price should be used. Figure 10 compares the forecast
accuracy of the fundamental random walk with drift for any value of the gap
with those made when the gap is large. It shows that, for horizons longer than 5
years, the forecast accuracy improves by 15-20 percentage points in the United
States, United Kingdom and Switzerland, if the forecasts are made when the
gap is large. In the United Kingdom, this strategy improves any forecasts with
a horizon longer than 3 years. I nd no improvement for Japan.
9 Conclusion
The results presented in this paper can be interpreted and exploited at dif-
ferent levels. The most obvious practical result is the ability of the C-CAPM
fundamental model to forecast future prices for short horizon. As mentioned
in the paper, the predictability of stock prices is not new. Several studies have
shown that simple ratios such as dividend-price ratios or price-earnings ratios
are useful for forecasting stock prices in the long term. Typically, these ratios
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are able to forecast price for horizons longer than ve years. What is new here
is that the C-CAPM fundamental model signicantly shortens the horizons
for which the forecast accuracy can be improved. Of course, the improvement
depends on the market and on the period in which the forecast is made, but
the results presented in this paper suggest that it is generally possible to nd a
way to combine the observed and the fundamental prices to improve forecasts
for horizons shorter than ve years. While long-term forecasts are of little in-
terest for traders or portfolio managers, whose performance is evaluated on
shorter intervals, forecast horizons in the range of those proposed in this pa-
per might nd their place in longer term portfolio allocation strategies. With
that in mind, it would be useful to study in greater depth how signicant and
reliable the improvement made by the fundamental model is and whether a
portfolio based on fundamental forecasts would have generated excess returns
in the past.
The C-CAPM fundamental model is also of interest for central banks and in-
ternational organizations such as the IMF or the BIS. Indeed, such institutions
show a growing interest in identifying imbalances on asset markets. Their fear
is that such imbalances will eventually unwind and that their correction might
have a signicant impact on the economy. Thus, by detecting imbalances early
enough, central banks hope to identify factors that could help them in pre-
dicting the evolution of the economy and choosing an appropriate policy. Two
results indicate that the imbalances measured by the C-CAPM fundamental
model would be relevant in this framework: rstly, there is strong empirical
evidence of a link between the C-CAPM fundamental price and the observed
stock price and secondly, the forecast horizon for which the fundamental model
is helpful corresponds to the horizon, which is normally considered as pertinent
for central bank policy (up to 3 or 5 years). In this context, an improvement
of the model would be to relax assumption 5 and extend the set of variables
used to forecast the fundamentals. As mentioned by Campbell (1999), con-
sumption is not well forecasted by its own history. It is therefore unlikely that
agents will rely purely on its dynamic to form their expectations. Expanding
the information set to other variables would rene the estimation of the gap
between the price and its fundamental value and give a better measure of
potential imbalances.
Central bankers may also be interested by the signs of money illusion found
for the United States, and to a lesser extent for the United Kingdom. In
the presence of money illusion, ination induces mispricing on stock markets.
Therefore, as suggested by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), a by-product of
ination-stabilizing monetary policies is to reduce the volatility of mispricing
and foster stock market e¢ ciency. More generally, the results of this paper
demonstrate the importance of ination in stock markets. The decrease in
ination observed in the last 20 years seems to be a plausible explanation for
the increase in PD ratios, whether through its impact on real fundamentals
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or on nominal ones via money illusion phenomenons.
Finally, from an academic point of view, the results presented in this paper
seem to rehabilitate to some extent the empirical relevance of the C-CAPM
with power utility. Indeed, since the seminal paper of Mehra and Prescott
(1985) documenting the equity premium puzzle raised by using the C-CAPM
with power utility, this model has been the target of multiple critiques. Nu-
merous articles have contested or defended its use in the context of stock
prices. In recent years, the trend seems to have been moving toward modi-
ed utility functions such as habit formation or loss aversion. Most of these
studies are based on the observation of stock returns. This paper sheds new
light on the C-CAPM with power utility by looking at stock prices instead
of returns. From this point of view, the empirical evidence is kinder with the
power utility C-CAPM, at least for the long-term evolution of stock prices.
Note that the methodology developed in this paper can be easily extended
to any other linear SDF model. It would be interesting to establish whether
utility functions that perform better than the power utility for stock returns
also give better results for the long-term dynamic of stock prices.
A Proofs
A.1 Second-order Taylor expansion of the log PD ratio
We start from the denition of the fundamental PD ratio in equation (5)
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where S = fs1; : : : ; sNg is the set of every possible state of nature s and s is
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We have that
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The rst-order term is
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The second derivative in the second-order term is
@2f
@pds1;t@pd

s2;t
= s1e
pds1;ts2e
pds2;tPS sepds;t2 if s1 6= s2 (A.6)
@2f
@pds1;t@pd

s2;t
=
s1e
pds1;t
PS sepds;t   s1epds1;t2PS sepds;t2 if s1 = s2 (A.7)
Evaluated at pd

t , the second derivative is
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Given that, the second-order term is
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Recollecting all these results, we nd that the Taylor expansion is
f
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and thus
lnEt (PD

t ) = Et (pd

t ) +
1
2
Vt (pd

t ) +Rt (A.12)
A.2 First-order approximation of the logarithm of a sum
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) show that it is possible to approximate
the logarithm of a sum by the sum of logarithms. First consider
ln (1 + PD) = ln

1 + epd

(A.13)
where pd = lnPD. The second part of this equation can be approximated by
a standard Taylor approximation around its mean. Dene f (x) = ln

1 + epd

and take the Taylor approximation of it around its mean:
f (pd)  f

pd

+ f 0

pd
 
pd   pd

(A.14)
with f 0

pd

= e pd

=

1 + e pd

. Dene  = 1=

1 + e pd

and plug it into
the previous equation to get the nal result
ln (1 + PD) ' + pd (A.15)
with  =   ln   (1  ) ln (1=  1).
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Abstract
The large spread between equity returns and risk-free rates (the "equity premium
puzzle") has been the subject of intense debate. Two main families of models claim
to solve this puzzle: habit-formation models and loss-aversion models. The goal
of this paper is to assess empirically which of them best ts the observed excess
returns. In order to do this, I rst show how to express both models as linear
stochastic discount factor models. This gives explicit and testable constraints for
the excess return variations. I then compare the theoretical evolution generated by
these models with the observed path. I nd that the constant relative risk aversion
model and the external habit model are not likely to correspond to the observed
data. The loss aversion model and the internal habit model could t the observed
excess return evolution.
Key words: Excess stock return; Habit formation; Loss aversion.
JEL classication: E21, E44, G12.
? The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reect the views of the Swiss National Bank.
1 Introduction
In 1985, Mehra and Prescott introduced the academic and nancial profession
to the "equity premium puzzle" (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). They claimed
that the di¤erence between returns on equities and risk free returns is too
large to be compatible with a traditional asset pricing model, which uses a
representative agent with constant relative risk aversion. They argued that
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) estimated with such a model
is much higher than the value found in experimental studies. This nding has
been replicated several times by other studies. Campbell (1999), for example,
estimates that the CRRA must be equal to 316 to match the equity premium
observed in the US between 1947 and 1996. Experiments, however, show that
the average CRRA usually lies between 0 and 5, with 10 being considered as
an extreme value.
Since then, numerous solutions have been proposed to reconcile the observed
equity premium with an asset pricing model based on a utility-maximizer
agent. It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the literature still being
generated by Mehra and Prescotts article. 1 The goal of this paper is rather to
propose a new way to test two categories of models that have recently caught
up much of researchersattention on this topic: habit formation models (Abel,
1990, Constantinides, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and loss aver-
sion models (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995, Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001,
De Giorgi, Hens, and Mayer, 2007). Both models claim to explain the equity
premium puzzle by using alternative utility functions. Habit formation models
postulate that the utility of the representative agent should be a function of
the di¤erence between her consumption and a habit, rather than of consump-
tion only. The habit represents a minimum level under which consumption
cannot fall (i.e. a subsistence level). Loss aversion utility functions have two
components: the traditional "consumption utility" based on consumption and
the "gain-loss utility" which is based on the deviation of consumption from
a reference level. Thus a loss-averse agent has an additional source of utility:
she gets (loses) some "extra" utility if she consumes more (less) than her ref-
erence level. The particularity of loss aversion models is that losses are more
"painful" than gains and thus a loss generates a greater decrease in utility
than the increase in utility that would be derived from a gain of the same size.
The early papers using these utility functions provide theoretical explanations
for the equity premium puzzle as well as empirical calibrations which back
their conclusions.
This paper contributes to the literature on the equity premium in two ways:
1 See e.g. Mehra and Prescott (2003) for a survey of selected issues on the equity
premium puzzle.
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rstly, it shows how to express both habit formation models and loss aversion
models in a common framework, namely as linear stochastic discount factor
(SDF) asset pricing models. The SDF form has two advantages: rst, it pro-
vides two di¤erent sets of explicit linear constraints on the dynamic of excess
returns, one for habit formation models and one for loss aversion models. The
second advantage is that the linear SDF form can be easily estimated using a
vector autoregressive (VAR) model with multivariate GARCH errors.
The combination of both advantages of the linear SDF form is at the roots of
the second innovation of this paper: by comparing the empirical variations in
excess returns with the theoretical constraints of habit formation models or
those of loss aversion models, it is possible to check whether the theoretical dy-
namic of one model corresponds to the observed variations or if it substantially
deviates from it. It is even possible to statistically test, e.g. with traditional
Wald test, if the null hypothesis of one model is rejected at a signicant con-
dence level. The ultimate goal of this exercise is to determine which model
(if any) is the closest to the observed excess returns. 2
Several previous studies have tried to assess the empirical validity of habit
formation or loss aversion models. The usual way to do this is to use GMM
estimation to match the model with a set of observed unconditional moments
and then to check whether the estimated coe¢ cients are plausible or if the
estimated model generates moments for other variables that are close to real-
ity. These studies provide contradictory evidence for habit formation models.
On the positive side, GMM estimations generally give parameters in line with
theory (cf. e.g. Hyde and Sherif (2005) for UK data, Allais, Cadiou, and Dées
(2000) for G7 countries and Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2001) for cross-
sectional stock returns). Li (2001) and Li and Zhong (2005) show that habit
formation models can explain some part of excess return predictability and
outperform power utility models in forecasting excess returns. Other studies
are less positive. Tallarini and Zhang (2005) reject a habit formation model
with the E¢ cient Method of Moments at a 1% level (but not at a 0.1% level)
and Chapman (2002) cannot reproduce Constantinides (1990) results with
post-war data. More doubts are cast on habit formation models when their
dynamic properties are examined. Li (2001) nds that volatility of returns
is positively related to surplus consumption, which is in contradiction with
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model. Du¤ee (2005) estimates that the price
of risk generated by habit formation does not vary enough to justify the evolu-
tion of the equity premium. Allais, Cadiou, and Dées (2000), Lettau and Uhlig
(2000) and Pijoan-Mas (2007) show that the consumption implied by habit
formation models is much smoother than what is observed in reality. 3 Let-
2 Note that the methodology presented here can be used to test the validity of any
model expressed in the form of a linear SDF model.
3 Jermann (1998) and Budría (2004) overcome this problem by introducing in-
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Fig. 1. Unconditional vs. conditional moments
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tau and Uhlig (2000) and Otrok, Ravikumar, and Whiteman (2002) nd that
habit formation models induce counterfactual cyclical behaviour (on labour
markets or concerning the evolution of the consumption variability and the
equity premium, respectively). On the other hand, Woehrmann, Semmler, and
Lettau (2005) nd that habit formation models generate a path for Sharpe
ratios that better ts the observed path than a model with CRRA does. Em-
pirical evidence on loss aversion models is scarcer. Using GMM estimation,
Yogo (2008) nds parameters corresponding to the theory and smaller pricing
errors for a model incorporating loss aversion.
The methodology presented in this paper completes and extends the previous
studies in three directions. Firstly, it provides a formal test of the coe¢ cients of
the excess returns dynamic. This make it possible to compare the entire path of
the di¤erent models rather than just their rst or second moments. Comparing
the observed and the theoretical paths rather than unconditional moments is
methodologically more robust. Indeed, one can easily imagine a model that
has the same rst and second moments as its theoretical counterpart but with
a totally di¤erent evolution (e.g. see Figure 1). Secondly, the approach used
here is based on conditional moments rather than unconditional ones. This is
closer to reality because investors act according to the information available
at the time when their decision is made (conditional information set). Finally,
this paper compares habit formation and loss aversion models in the same
methodological framework, which makes the comparison (and the potential
ranking of models) easier and coherent. To my knowledge, it is the rst study
that simultaneously compares the performance of habit formation models and
loss aversion models.
Specically, I test two habit formation models (the internal habit model of
Constantinides, 1990, and the external habit model of Campbell and Cochrane,
1999) and two loss aversion models (one in which the reference level is based
vestment costs and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) by assuming inertia in
production technology adjustments.
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on expectations, as in Benartzi and Thaler, 1995, and Barberis et al., 2001,
and one in which the reference level is based on past consumption, as in Yogo,
2008). I use monthly US data on consumption and stock market excess returns
over the period 1959-2005. The loss aversion models tested here di¤er from
their original specication, as the losses and gains are expressed in terms of
consumption rather than wealth.
I nd that the constant relative risk aversion model and the external habit
model are strongly rejected by the data. The observed excess return evolution
do not correspond to the path generated by these models. The constraints that
they impose on the dynamic are formally rejected by bothWald and Likelihood
ratio tests. The validity of the loss aversion model using past consumption
as the reference level is also doubtful. Although its restrictions cannot be
rejected at a 1% condence level, the values of the estimated parameters cast
some doubt on it. The two remaining models (internal habit formation and
loss aversion with expected consumption as the reference point) are possible
candidates for explaining the excess returns evolution. They cannot both be
rejected at a 1% condence level and have plausible parameters. The loss
aversion model has a slight advantage over the habit formation model as the
Wald test does not reject its constraints at a 10% level. 4
In addition to the ranking of the di¤erent models, I nd two interesting facts
concerning the evolution of excess returns. Firstly, as already documented
by Du¤ee (2005), the conditional covariance between excess returns and con-
sumption growth seems to be negatively related to excess returns. This is in
contradiction to the constant relative risk aversion model and the external
habit model. Secondly, consumption growth variance seems to play a role in
the excess return evolution. This factor does not appear in any of the proposed
models and thus might constitute a starting point for the development of a
more adequate model.
Section 2 presents the asset pricing equation used to test the model as well as
the test method. Section 3 shows how to express habit formation and loss aver-
sion models in the form of a linear SDF model. Section 4 gives the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
The methodology used in this paper is based on the tests for exact linear
rational expectations models developed by Hansen and Sargent (1981). This
4 Both Wald and Likelihodd ratio test reject the internal habit model at a 5%
condence level.
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method follows three steps:
(1) Draw up the theoretical model in order to derive some hypotheses (or
restrictions) on the joint dynamic of the variables.
(2) Estimate the empirical joint dynamic of the variables.
(3) Test whether the estimated dynamic is compatible with the theoretical
hypothesis made in the rst step.
This section shows how to derive hypotheses on the joint dynamic from any
linear SDF model. Section 3 then explains how to express the traditional
CRRA model, the habit formation model and the loss aversion model as linear
SDF models.
2.1 The C-CAPM no-arbitrage equation
The hypotheses on the joint dynamic are directly derived from the no-arbitrage
equation
Et (Mt+1Rt+1) = 0 (1)
where Mt+1 is the SDF, or pricing kernel, and Rt+1 is the excess return of
a risky asset over a risk-free bond. This no-arbitrage equation simply states
that the discounted expected excess return of risky assets is equal to zero or,
in other terms, that ex-ante there is no systematical discounted excess return.
The SDF Mt+1 can take di¤erent forms, depending on the model used to
describe the behaviour of asset prices. Each model considered in this paper
has a di¤erent SDF, but they share a common feature: they are derived from
the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). They all
start with the same maximisation problem, in which a representative agent
allocates her resources between savings and consumption in order to maximise
the utility of her present and future consumption. The SDF of the C-CAPM
is
Mt+1 = 
U 0 (Ct+1)
U 0 (Ct)
(2)
where  is a subjective discount factor and U 0 (Ct) is the marginal utility
of consumption at time t (see Cochrane, 2001, for more details). The only
di¤erence between the models presented here concerns the form taken by the
representative consumer utility function U (Ct). The SDF associated to the
di¤erent utility functions are presented in Section 3. In the next section, I
will use the general SDF model in equation (1) to explain the methodology
and then, when presenting each utility function, I will point out the specic
characteristics of each SDF.
Following Söderlind (2006), if we assume that log SDF mt+1 is normally dis-
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tributed and that mt+1 and the excess return Rt+1 have a bivariate mixture
normal (conditional) distribution, we have that
Et (Rt+1) =  Covt (mt+1; Rt+1) (3)
Economically, this equation species that the expected excess return is equal to
the expected risk premium for the risky asset. This no-arbitrage condition con-
stitutes the model tested in this paper. The test consists of verifying whether
the empirical excess return evolution is compatible with equation (3).
Note that traditionally, in the literature, another linearisation of equation (1)
is used by assuming log normal returns. Under this assumption, a correction
for Jensens e¤ect is added to the no-arbitrage equation (3), which becomes
Et (Rt) + Vt (Rt+1) =  Covt (mt+1; Rt+1). Empirically, asset returns distrib-
utions are well known to have fat tails. The mixture of normal distribution
used here is more exible and can take di¤erent shapes that allow for such fat
tails. It is therefore more likely to t the returns real distribution than the
log normal distribution. The cost of this greater exibility for the returns dis-
tribution is to assume that the (conditional) log SDF is normally distributed.
Söderlind (2006) shows that for SDF based on consumption, this hypothesis
is much more likely to be true than for excess returns.
2.2 Specifying the joint dynamic of the variables
Equation (3) suggests that second moments of the joint distribution of mt+1
and Rt+1 are time varying and that the evolution of mt+1 and Rt+1 is a func-
tion of their second moments. These characteristics corresponds to the VAR-
GARCH-M model (Pelloni and Polasek, 1999, Polasek and Ren, 2000). This
model is the multivariate version of the univariate GARCH-in-mean model of
Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge (1988). The VAR-GARCH-M model takes
the following form
yt = + Ayt 1 +Bht 1 +Det 1 + "t (4)
ht = ! + Fht 1 +Get 1 (5)
ht = vech fHtg
et = vech f"t"0tg
Ht = Et 1 ("t"0t)
where yt =

Rt; : : : ; Rt j; mt; : : : ; mt j

is a vector of observations, A, B,
C and D are matrices of coe¢ cients,  and ! are vectors of coe¢ cients and
"t is a vector of error terms. The vech operator converts the lower triangle
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of a symmetric matrix into a vector. Finally, Ht is the expected covariance 5
matrix at time t, The model is made up of three parts: equation (5) shows that
a) the covariances follow a GARCH model and equation (4) shows that b) the
variables are a linear function of their past values (as in a VAR model) and
c) of the conditional second moments (as in a traditional GARCH-M model).
2.3 The joint dynamic implied by the C-CAPM
The next step is to derive the restrictions that the no-arbitrage equation (3)
imposes on the coe¢ cient of the VAR-GARCH-M model. Let us dene yt =
1 yt ht et

and rewrite the VAR-GARCH-M with this new variable
yt = Ayt 1 + "t (6)
with
A =
2666666664
1 0 0 0
 A B D
! 0 F G
! 0 F G
3777777775
and "t =
2666666664
0
"t
0
t
3777777775
where t is a vector of white noise. Rewriting equation (3) in terms of the
vector yt gives
g0Et (yt+1) = 0 (7)
where g0 is a vector that selects the variables appearing in equation (3); namely
EtRt+1 and Eth12t+1 = Covt (Rt+1;mt+1).
From equation (6), we obtain the following expectation about yt+1
Et (yt+1) = Ayt (8)
Plugging this expectation into equation (7) gives
g0Ayt = 0 (9)
Thus, the coe¢ cients A of the variablesdynamic must satisfy the constraint
g0A = 0 (10)
in order for equation (3) to hold. The vector g0 depends on the form of the
SDF, which di¤ers for each model studied in this paper. For the general SDF
model, this constraint implies that the excess return evolution should be a
5 In this paper, the term covariance includes also the variances of the variables.
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negative function of the expected covariance between the excess return and
the SDF:
Rt =  Covt 1 (Rt;mt) + "Rt (11)
where "Rt is a white noise.
The econometric test consists of checking whether the estimated unconstrained
VAR with coe¢ cient matrix A is signicantly di¤erent from the estimated
VAR, where the above constraints are imposed. This can be done using clas-
sical Wald tests or Likelihood Ratio tests (see Greene, 2000, p. 150).
3 The di¤erent utility functions and their SDF
3.1 Constant relative risk aversion
Power utility, which implies constant relative risk aversion, is the original
utility function used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). I use it as a benchmark
for habit formation and loss aversion models and to check that the equity
premium puzzle is present when conditional moments are used on the specic
data set investigated in this paper.
The power utility function is
U (C) =
1X
i=0
i
C1 t+i
1   (12)
where Ct is the consumption of the representative agent at time t and  is her
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The SDF derived from power utility is
mt+1 =  ct+1 (13)
where ct+1 = lnCt+1  lnCt is the consumption growth rate. With this SDF
the no-arbitrage equation (3) is
Et (Rt+1) = covt (ct+1; Rt+1) (14)
3.2 Habit formation models
The particularity of habit formation models is that utility is a function of
the gap between consumption and a habit Ht, instead of consumption level
only. The habit is dened as a subsistence level under which consumption
cannot fall. The habit can be a function of past consumptions ("Catching up
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with the Joneses" functions introduced by Abel, 1990) or of past and present
consumption ("Keeping up with the Joneses" functions introduced by Gali,
1994). There are two main families of habit formation utility functions. In
the rst one, utility is a function of the di¤erence between consumption and
the habit (e.g. Constantinides, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). In the
second one, utility is a function of the ratio between consumption and the
habit (e.g. Abel, 1990, 1999, Gali, 1994). This paper focuses on the rst kind
of habit formation utility functions, which has recently attracted most of the
attention in the literature. The utility function is dened as
U (C) =
1X
i=0
i
(Ct+i  Ht+i)1 
1   (15)
where  is a parameter such that 0 <   1.
Meyer and Meyer (2005) demonstrate that habit formation utility functions
are equivalent to utility functions with decreasing relative risk aversion. Thus,
they imply time varying relative risk aversion. If consumption is close to (far
from) the habit, the agent has high (low) relative risk aversion.
Habit formation models make a distinction between internal and external
habits. The representative agent has internal habits when she takes into ac-
count the impact of her present consumption on her current and future habit
level. Internal habit models have been introduced by Constantinides (1990)
and Abel (1990). External habits (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) correspond
to the case in which agents ignore the impact of their present consumption on
habit levels. Chen and Ludvigson (2004) try to determine which alternative
best corresponds to the observed data. They conclude their data are better de-
scribed by internal habit formation than by external habit formation models.
Both alternatives are tested in this paper.
3.2.1 Internal habit model
The particularity of internal habit utility model is that agents take into ac-
count the impact of their present consumption on present and future habits.
Thus, using the utility function in equation (15), the marginal utility of present
consumption is equal to
U 0 (Ct) = (Ct  Ht)   
1X
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  @Ht+i
@Ct
(16)
The rst part of the right hand side of the equation is the utility obtained by
consuming one additional unit of a good today. The second part is the reduc-
tion of present and future utility that this additional unit induces through its
e¤ect on the habit. In other terms, consuming more today brings more utility
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to the agent today but, at the same time, increases her (present and future)
habit, which reduces her (present and future) utility.
As in the original model of Constantinides (1990), I model the habit as a
function of past and present consumption. More particularly, the habit is equal
to
Ht = C
0
t C
1
t 1:::C
k
t k (17)
where the  parameters are smaller than one and chosen such that consumption
does not fall under the habit.
Appendix B shows how to linearise equation (16) to get the log SDF of the
internal habit utility function. This log SDF takes the form:
mt+1 =
k+1X
i= k+1
ict+i (18)
where i are coe¢ cient that mix utility function parameters and linearization
parameters.
With internal habits, the SDF is a function of future and past consumption
growth rates, whereas it was a function of only the next period growth rate
with the simple power utility model. Note also that the coe¢ cients  are
di¤erent from the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
Using this SDF in equation (3) yields
Et (Rt+1) =  
kX
i=1
iCovt (ct+i; Rt+1) (19)
Note that the conditional covariance between ct+i and Rt+1 is equal to the
covariance between the errors made at time t about ct+i and Rt+1 respec-
tively. According to the VAR in equation (6), the error made at time t about
the consumption growth rate at time t+ i is a linear function of all one-period
errors between time t and t+ i. Thus we have
"Rt+1 = Rt+1   Et (Rt+1) = g0R"t+1 (20)
"ct;t+i = ct+i   Et (ct+i) = g0c
iX
j=1
Ai j"t+j (21)
where g0R and g
0
c are row vectors with zero in each column, with the excep-
tion of one 1 in the column corresponding to Rt and ct in the vector yt,
respectively. These vectors select the one period error on Rt and ct respec-
tively. With this notation, and given the fact that the error terms are not
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autocorrelated, we have that
Covt (ct+i; Rt+1) = g
0
REt

"0t+1"t+1

(A0)i 1 gc (22)
By developing the matrices and vectors in this expression, it can be shown
that this is equivalent to
Covt (ct+i; Rt+1) = ai;1Vt (Rt+1) + ai;2Covt (Rt+1;ct+1) (23)
where ai;1 and ai;2 are coe¢ cients that are a linear combination of the coe¢ -
cient in the matrix (A0)i 1 . Plugging this result into equation (19) yields
Et (Rt+1) = a1Vt (Rt+1) + a2Covt (ct+1) (24)
with a1 =
Pk
i=1 iai;1 and a2 =
Pk
i=1 iai;2.
3.2.2 External habit model
In external habit models, the representative agent does not take into account
the inuence of her consumption on her habit level (future or present). This
kind of model has been initiated by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and I
will concentrate on their model. The utility function is the same as in the
internal habit model presented in the previous section (cf. equation (15)). With
external habits, we have a situation where the marginal utility of consumption
is equal to
U 0 (Ct) = (Ct  Ht)  (25)
Dening the consumption surplus St = Ct HtCt and using it to compute the
logarithm of the SDF yields
mt+1 =  ct+1   st+1 (26)
where st = lnSt   lnSt 1.
One particularity of Campbell and Cochranes model is to dene the evolution
for the surplus st as follows 6
st+1 = (1  !) s+ !st +  (st) (ct+1   Et (ct+1)) (27)
where s is the steady state surplus level, ! is a persistence parameter (0 
 < 1) and  (st) is the sensitivity of the surplus to unexpected changes in
6 In the original model, Campbell and Cochrane use constant growth in consump-
tion to compute Et (ct+1). This generalisation is taken from Wachter (2005).
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consumption, which is dened as
 (st) =
8><>:
1
S
q
1  2 (st   s)  1 if st < smax
0 if st  smax
(28)
where S = exp (s) and smax = s + 12

1  S2

. 7 With this dynamic, we have
the following
mt+1= ct+1  
  ((1  !) s+ (!   1) st +  (st) (ct+1   Et (ct+1))) (29)
Taking the conditional covariance of the log SDF with the expected excess
return as equation (3) requires yields
Et (Rt+1) =  (1 +  (st))Covt (Rt+1;ct+1) (30)
With Campbell and Cochranes model, the relative risk aversion is equal to
 (1 +  (st)) and is thus time varying. Since sensitivity  (st) is negatively
correlated with the surplus, then, the closer the agent is to its habit, the
higher  (st) is and thus the higher her relative risk aversion.
The constrained model can be estimated by simultaneously estimating the
VAR-GARCH-M together with equation (27). The resulting sensitivity  (st)
is used for the varying coe¢ cient associated to Covt (Rt+1;ct+1) in the VAR-
GARCH-M model.
3.3 Loss aversion functions
Utility functions with loss aversion are based on the Cumulative Prospect
Theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In this framework, utility is a function of
the di¤erence between consumption and a reference level. 8 The particularity
of loss aversion functions is that losses have a bigger impact on utility than
gains of the same magnitude. In this paper, I study two types of loss aversion
utility functions: one in which the reference level is expected consumption
7 Sensitivity  (st) is set equal to 0 when st > smax = s + 12
 
1  S2 to ensure a
positive term in the square root.
8 The reference level is di¤erent from the habit level, which is dened as a subsis-
tance level. Consumption may fall below the reference level in loss aversion models,
whereas it has to stay above the subsistance level in habit formation models.
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and one in which the reference level is based on past consumption. Note that
in the original papers Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) use a loss aversion function based on gains and losses in nancial
wealth. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) justify the use of wealth instead
of consumption as a way to capture "feelings unrelated to consumption" (p.
6). To remain close to the C-CAPM framework, in which an agents utility is
only inuenced by her consumption, I use a loss aversion function dened on
consumption rather than on nancial wealth.
Following Köszegi and Rabin (2006), I use the general class of loss aversion
function given by
U (C) =
1X
i=0
i (V (Ct+i) + (1  )W (V (Ct+i)  V (Xt+i))) (31)
with  2 [0; 1]. The utility of consumption in each period has two components:
the rst component V (Ct+i) is traditional "consumption utility". The second
component W (V (Ct+i)  V (Xt+i)) is "gain-loss utility", which is the utility
derived from the deviation of consumption Ct+i from a reference level Xt+i.
With this function, in addition to the utility of her consumption, the agent can
obtain "extra" utility if she consumes more than her reference level (gain in
consumption utility). Similarly, if the agent consumes less than her reference
level (loss in consumption utility), she will get less utility. Typically, with loss
aversion, losses are more "painful" than gains and thus a loss generates a
greater drop in utility than the increase in utility that would be derived from
a gain of the same size.
In the next steps, I assume that the reference level is similar to the external
habit in the sense that agents do not take into account the e¤ect of their
consumption on their present and future reference levels (i.e. @Xt+i=@Ct = 0).
With this assumption, the marginal utility of consumption is equal to
U 0 (Ct) = V 0 (Ct) ( + (1  )W 0 (V (Ct)  V (Xt))) (32)
Using a rst-order Taylor approximation of the logarithm of this expression,
we obtain (see Appendix A)
u0 (Ct) = k + v0 (Ct) + qw0 (V (Ct)  V (Xt)) (33)
where k and q are linearisation parameters.
I assume that the consumption utility is the traditional power utility function
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(V (Ct) = C1 t = (1  )) and that the gain-loss utility takes the form
W (Z) =
8><>:
Z1 
1  if Z  0
  ( Z)1 
1  if Z < 0
(34)
where  > 1 and Z is the gain or loss of the agent. The parameter  is the
degree of loss aversion. The greater it is, the larger is the decrease in utility
associated with a loss. Since  > 1, the utility gain associated with a gain Z
is smaller than the utility loss associated with a loss of the same size Z. With
this specication, we nd that the logarithm of the marginal gain-loss utility
is
w0 (Z) =
8><>:   lnZ if Z  0ln     ln ( Z) if Z < 0 (35)
In our case, Zt = V (Ct) V (Xt) and with a rst order Taylor approximation
of its logarithm, we nd that (see Appendix C)
u0 (Ct) =
8><>: k
+ + q+ct + p
+xt if ct  xt
k  + q ct + p xt if ct < xt
(36)
where ks, qs and ps are linear combination of the utility functions parameters
and the linearisation parameters.
With this linear function, it is possible to compute the log SDF. The SDF
takes two di¤erent forms, depending on the initial level of consumption. If the
initial level of consumption is below the reference point (ct < xt), then
mt+1 =
8><>:k + q
+ct+1 + p
+xt+1 +qct  pxt if ct+1  xt+1
q ct+1 + p xt+1 if ct+1 < xt+1
(37)
where k = k+   k , q = q+   q  and p = p+   p . If the initial level of
consumption is above the reference point (ct > xt), then
mt+1 =
8><>: q
+ct+1 + p
+xt+1 if ct+1  xt+1
 k + q ct+1 + p xt+1  qct  pxt if ct+1 < xt+1
(38)
To compute the covariance between Rt+1 and mt+1, we use the following rela-
tionship (see Appendix D)
Cov (X;BY ) =
 

E (Y )
V 1=2 (Y )
+ 
!
Cov (X; Y ) (39)
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whereX and Y are two variables that are jointly normally distributed and B is
a binary variable that take the value B+ and B  in the event of gain and loss,
respectively. Furthermore,  =  (B+  B ) and  = 2+2

B + (1 )
2+2
1  B
+
where  is the probability of observing a loss and  is the probability of observ-
ing neither a gain nor a loss. With this relationship, it is possible to compute
the covariance with the SDF in both situations (with initial consumption be-
low or above the reference level). The covariance with the constants is equal to
zero since that case is equivalent to Y = 1. Furthermore, as the reference level
for the next period is known at time t (since it is equal to expected consump-
tion or dened with respect to past consumption), its conditional covariance
with Rt+1 is also equal to 0. Therefore, in both cases, we have
Covt (Rt+1;mt+1) =
 
t
Et (ct+1)
V
1=2
t (ct+1)
+ t
!
Covt (Rt+1;ct+1) (40)
where t = tq and t =
2t+
2
t
t
q + (1 t)
2+2t
1 t q
+ where t is the probability
of observing a loss at time t+ 1 and t is the probability of observing neither
a gain or a loss.
Using this equation, we have
Et (Rt+1) =   tCovt (Rt+1;ct+1) (41)
with  t = t
Et (ct+1)
V
1=2
t (ct+1)
+ t (42)
The probability t that consumption falls below the reference level plays a
signicant role here since it determines the parameter  t. To compute this
probability, I use two di¤erent reference levels. In the rst model (Loss aversion
A), the reference level is equal to expected consumption
Xt+1 = Et (Ct+1) (43)
The logarithm of expected consumption can be approximated by a second
order Taylor approximation, which gives
xt+1 = ct + Et (ct+1) +
1
2
Vt (ct+1) (44)
With this we can compute the probability t that the consumption level will
fall below the reference level:
Pr (ct+1 < xt+1) = Pr

"ct+1 <
1
2
Vt (ct+1)

= 

1
2
V
1=2
t (ct+1)

(45)
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where  () is the cumulative normal distribution.
In the second model (Loss aversion B), the other reference point is dened as
a function of past consumption levels such that
Xt+1 = C
'
t X
1 '
t (46)
With this denition, we can derive the dynamic of the di¤erence dt = ct   xt
between the log consumption and the reference level
dt = (1  ') dt 1 +ct (47)
With this, the probability t that the consumption level will fall below the
reference level is
Pr (ct+1 < xt+1) = Pr

"ct+1 <   (1  ') dt   Et (ct+1)

(48)
= 
 
 (1  ') dt + g
0
cAyt
V
1=2
t (ct+1)
!
4 Empirical results
4.1 Data
The data set contains monthly data on US consumption, prices and excess
stock returns. The data are provided by Datastream. The excess return is
the di¤erence between the S&P500 index monthly return and the secondary
market return on 3-month treasury bills. The real consumption growth rate
ct is computed using the US personal consumption expenditure index and
the consumption price index. I examine the period between January 1965 and
March 2007 (507 observations for each series).
4.2 Estimation method for the VAR-GARCH-M
As seen in section 2.2, the VAR-GARCH-M is an appropriate choice for mod-
elling the joint dynamic implied by the no-arbitrage condition of the C-CAPM
model. However, it has the disadvantage of being heavily parametrised. To
limit the number of coe¢ cients, I include only one lag for each variable of
the model, which corresponds to a VAR(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M(1) model. Fur-
thermore, I assume that the consumption growth rate ct depends only on
its past values and on past excess returns. In other words, its dynamic does
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not include a "in-mean" term, which is equivalent to setting the last two rows
of matrix B in equation (4) equal to 0. In addition, the parameters of the
variance-covariance dynamic must fulll a number of conditions in order to
ensure a positive denite covariance matrix. In order to achieve this, I apply
the the BEKK specication (Engle and Kroner, 1995) to model the multivari-
ate GARCH dynamic. The model can then be estimated by maximising the
log likelihood function. 9
I estimate three versions of the VAR-GARCH-M. The rst one (Model 1) is
the model in equation (4) and (5) with y0t =

Rt ct

. This model is used to
check whether the constraints of the constant relative risk aversion and the
internal habit models are veried by the empirical data. The external habit
model (Model 2) is a slightly modied version of Model 1. Firstly, as equation
(30) shows, the covariance between the excess returns and the consumption
growth enters into the excess return dynamic with a time varying coe¢ cient.
To take this into account, one term is added to equation (4)
yt = + Ayt 1 +Bht 1 +Det 1 + fwt + "t (49)
where w0t =  (st 1)

h12t 1 e
12
t 1

and f is a vector of coe¢ cients. Since I have
assumed that ct is independent from the covariance term, I set the last row
of f equal to zero. Sensitivity  (st 1) is computed with equation (28). The
surplus dynamic in equation (27) is estimated simultaneously with the VAR-
GARCH-M equations (4) and (5) using likelihood maximisation. 10
Similarly, the third version of the VAR-GARCH-M (Model 3) estimated the
loss aversion models. Firstly, I estimate the equation (41) using the following
model
yt = + Ayt 1 +Bht 1 +Det 1 + vt + "t (50)
where v0t =

tEt (ct+1) =V
1=2
t (ct+1) + t
 
h12t 1 e
12
t 1

with t = t (q1   q2)
and t = q1

2t + 
2
t

=t+ q2

(1  t)2 + 2t

= (1  t). As in Model 2, the
second row of the coe¢ cient vector  is set equal to zero. In the Loss aversion
A model (expected consumption as reference level), probability t and t are
simply
t = 

1
2

h2t
1=2
and t = 

1
2

h2t
1=2
(51)
Similarly to the surplus dynamic equation in Model 2, iIn the Loss aversion
B model (reference level as function of past consumption), the dynamic of
9 See Hamilton (1994) for a more complete introduction to multivariate GARCH
models and their estimation with maximum likelihood methods.
10 Technically, the estimation of the surplus dynamic equation (30) is similar to the
estimation of the variance dynamic in a GARCH model.
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Table 1
Estimated unconstrained model 1
Rt ct V
1
t V
2
t Covt
c -0.0064 0.0029** 7.56e-5** 1.50e-5* 0.98e-5*
Rt 1 -0.0275 0.0251**
ct 1 0.4062 -0.2063**
V 1t 1 3.8866 0.8681**
V 2t 1 258.5174* 0.2908**
Covt 1 -114.9734** 0.5024**
"Rt 1
2
-1.1415 0.0918**
"ct 1
2
15.9545 0.2596**
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 2.7790 0.1544**
Log likelihood 2823.608
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level. V 1t = Vt(Rt+1), V
2
t = Vt(ct+1)
and Covt = Covt(Rt+1;ct+1)
the di¤erence between consumption and the reference level dt is estimated
simultaneously with equation (47). Probability t and t are then
t = 
 
 (1  ) dt + g
0
cAyt
(h2t )
1=2
!
and t = 
 
 (1  ) dt + g
0
cAyt
(h2t )
1=2
!
(52)
4.3 Estimation of the joint dynamic
The estimation of the unconstrained Model 1 is displayed in Table 1. Figure
2 shows the observed excess returns and the expected excess return, given
Model 1. Most of the coe¢ cients of the model are not signicant, with the
exception of those associated to past consumption growth variance and to
past covariance between consumption and excess returns. Note that the latter
is signicantly negative. The parameters of the consumption growth rate dy-
namic, conditional variances and conditional covariance are all signicant. The
excess return variance has the strongest inertia of the three second moments,
followed by the covariance. Figure 3 shows the estimated second moments of
excess returns and the consumption growth rate.
An important observation about the plausibility of the di¤erent models can
already be made by looking at the joint dynamic coe¢ cients. Note that the
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Fig. 2. Excess Returns
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Grey line: observed excess returns. Black line: estimated excess returns with
Model 1.
past conditional covariance between excess returns and consumption growth
rates enters the equation with a signicant negative coe¢ cient and that the co-
e¢ cient associated to the product of past residuals is not signicant. Since the
conditional covariance is a positive function of both terms, it suggests that the
conditional covariance is inversely related to expected excess returns, as docu-
mented by Du¤ee (2005). The relationship is the opposite when unconditional
moments are used. A negative correlation between conditional covariance and
expected excess returns contradicts the results obtained from models based
on power utility or external habit. Such correlation is, however, possible for
some particular congurations of the external habit coe¢ cients or for loss aver-
sion utility. In the loss aversion case, this can be explained by the fact that
loss averse agents can be risk lovers when they expect losses in consumption.
Specically, since losses cause negative utility, loss averse agents are ready to
take more risk to avoid them. Risk-loving agents (or at least "occasional" risk
loving agents) can then explain the observed negative correlation between the
expected return and the conditional covariance.
4.4 Constant relative risk-aversion model
The estimated coe¢ cients of the CRRA model are presented in Table 2. Not
surprisingly, the coe¢ cient of consumption growth and of the second moments
are very similar to those of the unconstrained model.
With the VAR-GARCH-M approach, the estimated coe¢ cient of relative aver-
sion is approximately equal to 42. This value is in line with other previous stud-
ies and is well above the values that are traditionally considered as admissible.
However, some authors claim that such a value might still be compatible with
a representative agent with CRRA. Hens and Wohrmann (2006), for example,
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Fig. 3. Estimated conditional second moments
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show that when mental accounting is applied to the CRRA model (as is nor-
mally done in experiments), an estimated CRRA higher than 10 is compatible
with experimental results. The methodology proposed here o¤ers another way
to test the validity of the CRRA model, by comparing the theoretical and
the observed evolution, rather than by assessing the plausibility of the coef-
cient value. The unconstrained and the constrained expected excess returns
are presented in Figure 4. A rst visual comparison suggests that both paths
are quite di¤erent. In other words, the factors included in the unconstrained
model but not in the CRRA model seem to have an impact on the evolution
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Table 2
Estimated constant relative risk aversion model
Rt ct V
1
t V
2
t Covt
c 0.0029** 9.28e-5** 1.30e-5* 1.02e-5*
Rt 1 0.0229**
ct 1 -0.2050**
 41.9390**
V 1t 1 0.8829**
V 2t 1 0.3620**
Covt 1 0.5654**
"Rt 1
2
0.0650**
"ct 1
2
0.2492**
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 0.1273**
Log likelihood 2812.971
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level. V 1t = Vt(Rt+1), V
2
t = Vt(ct+1)
and Covt = Covt(Rt+1;ct+1).
Fig. 4. Estimated excess returns with CRRA
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Grey line: Unconstrained model 1. Black line: Constant relative risk aversion model.
of expected excess returns. Wether this impact is statistically signicant is
formally tested in section 4.9. A few statistics already give us some indica-
tion. The rank correlation 11 between the expected excess returns given by
11 The rank correlation (Spearman correlation) is similar to the traditional correla-
tion. It measure the link between two variables. The di¤erence between traditional
and rank correlations is that the former indicate the strength of the linear link
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the unrestricted model and those given by the CRRA model is -0.05, which is
negative but not signicant. More worrying, when we restrict the sample to
the months when the excess return is more extreme (inferior to the rst quar-
tile or superior to the third quartile), the rank correlation becomes signicant
and equal to -0.13. This means that the CRRA model tends to gives expected
returns in the wrong direction when the excess returns (positive or negative)
are large by historical standards.
4.5 Internal habit formation
The estimated coe¢ cients of the internal habit formation model are presented
in Table 3. The coe¢ cients of the consumption growth rate dynamic and the
second moments are similar to those of the unconstrained model. As opposed
to the CRRA model, the coe¢ cient associated with the covariance (2) is
non signicant (and negative). In this model, the excess return variance has a
signicant positive impact. The higher the excess return variance, the higher
the expected return. This positive e¤ect between excess return and its variance
is well known from GARCH-in-mean analysis.
Figure 5 compares the expected excess returns of the unrestricted model with
the excess return of the internal habit formation model. With this model, the
rank correlation between them is signicant and equal to 0.25. This implies
that the excess returns generated with the internal habit formation model
move in the same direction as the expected excess returns. Since the CRRA
is a constrained version of the internal habit model (with 1 = 0), we can
test whether the internal habit formation model signicantly improves the
CRRA model with a Wald test. The null hypothesis (1 = 0) is rejected at a
1% condence level. All these facts provide some indications that the internal
habit formation model improves the traditional CRRA model.
4.6 External habit formation
As explained in Section 4.2, the unconstrained model for the external habit
model is slightly di¤erent from Model 1, in order to incorporate a time-varying
coe¢ cient associated with covariance. The results of both the unconstrained
and the constrained models for the external habit formation model are pre-
sented in Table 4. The coe¢ cients of the consumption growth dynamic and the
second moments dynamics are very similar to Model 1 in both models. Con-
trary to Model 1, in the excess return equation, the coe¢ cient associated with
between two variables whereas the latter gives the strength of the link without
assuming any particular form for this link.
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Table 3
Estimated internal habit model
Rt ct V
1
t V
2
t Covt
c 0.0029** 6.96e-5** 1.34e-5* 1.03e-5*
Rt 1 0.0238**
ct 1 -0.2008**
1 2.2691**
2 -0.0887
V 1t 1 0.8890**
V 2t 1 0.3512**
Covt 1 0.5587**
"Rt 1
2
0.0740**
"ct 1
2
0.2490**
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 0.1358**
Log likelihood 2816.191
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level. V 1t = Vt(Rt+1), V
2
t = Vt(ct+1)
and Covt = Covt(Rt+1;ct+1)
Fig. 5. Estimated excess returns with the internal habit formation
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Grey line: Unconstrained model 1. Black line: Internal habit formation model.
the past covariance is no longer signicant. The coe¢ cient of consumption
growth variance remains signicant. All other coe¢ cients are not signicant.
The constrained model indicates that the estimated parameter  of the habit
utility function is 0.61, which is consistent with its theoretical value. Figure 6
displays the expected excess returns of the unconstrained and the constrained
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Fig. 6. Estimated excess returns with external habit formation model
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Grey line: Unconstrained model 2. Black line: External habit formation model.
models. The rank correlation between the two series is statistically signicant
and equal to -0.15. This implies that the excess returns generated by the ex-
ternal habit formation models move in the opposite direction to the expected
excess returns. This is a rst negative sign for the external habit model.
In addition to the results presented in Table 4 and Figure 6, the estimation of
the external habit also provides us with an estimation of the surplus dynamic
given by equation (27). The estimated parameters that are relevant for the
surplus dynamic are
! = 0:9924 and S = 59:36%
I nd an average surplus equal to 59% of total consumption. Figure 7 gives the
estimated evolution for the surplus generated by these parameters as well as
the evolution of the sensitivity and its estimated distribution. The estimation
shows that the surplus was the lowest between 1981 and 1983 with a minimum
of 55.8% of total consumption in June 1982. The rst half of the nineties is
also a period in which the surplus was relatively low. Since then it has been
situated below its mean but close to it. These results suggest that investors
were the most risk-averse in 1981-1983 and in the rst half of the nineties.
Accordingly, during these period they required higher returns to compensate
for risk. Note that, I observe no signicant correlation between the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion and the covariance between consumption growth and excess
returns. Thus, according to this estimation, risk aversion is independent of the
risk associated with the stock market.
The estimated persistence factor ! estimated here is slightly higher than in
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) (0.9924 vs. 0.9856). The estimated average sur-
plus is about 10 times greater than than estimated by Campbell and Cochrane:
59.36% vs. 5.7%! One consequence of this di¤erence is that the surplus esti-
mated here moves much further away from the habit than in Campbell and
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Table 4
Estimated external habit model
Unconstrained model 2
Rt ct V
1
t V
2
t Covt
c -0.0177 0.0029** 5.71e-5** 1.85e-5* 1.40e-5*
Rt 1 -0.0525 0.0261**
ct 1 0.5299 -0.2161**
V 1t 1 2.3552 0.8615**
V 2t 1 348.8674* 0.1815**
Covt 1t -1290.8180 0.3955**
"Rt 1
2
-1.3288 0.1110**
"ct 1
2
16.2469 0.2673**
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 82.2660 0.1722**
 0.0164
Covt 1 1830.7340
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 -115.7720
Log likelihood 2832.693
Constrained model
c 0.0029** 8.42e-5** 1.24e-5** 0.77e-5**
Rt 1 0.0241**
ct 1 -0.2049**
V 1t 1 0.8782**
V 2t 1 0.3812**
Covt 1 0.5785**
"Rt 1
2
0.0772**
"ct 1
2
0.2483**
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 0.1385**
 0.6142
Log likelihood 2815.027
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level. V 1t = Vt(Rt+1), V
2
t = Vt(ct+1),
Covt = Covt(Rt+1;ct+1) and  = (st 1).
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Fig. 7. Estimated suprlus and sensitivity
log Surplus
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In each panel, the solid black line corresponds to the theoretical maximum surplus and the dashed grey line to the average surplus.
The upper right panel shows the sensitivity corresponding to the estimated surplus. The lower right panel displays the function
linking the sensitivity (vertical axis) to the surplus (horizontal axis).
Cochrane. With such a large gap, sensitivity is relatively stable and low. This
implies that the price of risk generated by external habit formation model is
also stable and low. This is in line with Du¤ee (2005), who argues that the
price of risk in the external habit formation model does not vary enough to
justify the large swings in the equity premium and dismisses Campbell and
Cochranes external habit formation model.
4.7 Loss-aversion model A (reference point based on expected consumption)
The estimation of the loss-aversion model with a reference point based on
expected consumption is presented in Table 5. As for previous models, the co-
e¢ cients for consumption growth and conditional second moments are similar
to Model 1. In the unconstrained model, all coe¢ cients are non-signicant.
Figure 8 presents the expected excess returns given by the unconstrained
model and by the restricted model. We observe a rank correlation of 0.06,
which is not statistically signicant. In addition, the estimation gives us the
following parameters
q  = 112:29 and q+ =  102:88
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Table 5
Estimated loss aversion model A
Unconstrained model 3
Rt ct V
1
t V
2
t Covt
c -0.0048 0.0028** 6.90e-5** 1.76e-5 1.24e-5
Rt 1 -0.0136 0.0269**
ct 1 0.3605 -0.1849**
V 1t 1 3.8066 0.8620**
V 2t 1 272.9046 0.2149**
Covt 1 -128.9434 0.4304**
"Rt 1
2
-1.3869 0.1032**
"ct 1
2
9.6495 0.2552** .
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 9.6022 0.1623**
t 0.0002
tCovt 1 2.7163
t"
R
t 1"
c
t 1 -0.6421
Log likelihood 2825.084
Constrained model
c 0.0028** 8.97e-5** 1.39e-5** 1.09e-5**
Rt 1 0.0221**
ct 1 -0.1933**
V 1t 1 0.8835**
V 2t 1 0.3445**
Covt 1 0.5517**
"Rt 1
2
0.0636**
"ct 1
2
0.2312**
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 0.1213**
Log likelihood 2813.880
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level. V 1t = Vt(Rt+1), V
2
t = Vt(ct+1)
and Covt = Covt(Rt+1;ct+1):
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Fig. 8. Estimated excess returns with loss aversion A
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Grey line: Unconstrained model 3. Black line: Loss aversion A.
Fig. 9. Gap with reference level and probability to fall under it (loss aversion A)
Gap
-0.010
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Probability
0.5008
0.5012
0.5016
0.5020
0.5024
0.5028
0.5032
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Left panel: gap between the consumption and its reference level. Right panel: probability for the consumption to be under its
reference level in the next period.
Note however that these two coe¢ cients are not statistically signicantly dif-
ferent from each other, which makes it di¢ cult to infer some value for the
utility parameter  (cf. Appendix C). With these coe¢ cients it is possible to
estimate the changes in the di¤erence between the reference level and actual
consumption and the probability to fall under the reference level in the next
period (cf. Figure 9). We can see that this probability varies from one period
to another, but stays very close to its mean of 50.11%.
4.8 Loss aversion model B (reference level based on past consumption)
The estimation of the loss-aversion model with a reference level based on past
consumption is presented in Table 6. As for previous models, the coe¢ cients
of the consumption growth and conditional second moments are similar to
Model 1. In the unconstrained model, all coe¢ cients are non signicant. The
results of the constrained model are more disturbing because the coe¢ cients
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Fig. 10. Estimated excess returns with loss aversion B
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Grey line: Unconstrained model 3. Black line: Loss aversion B.
are non signicant, which is very di¤erent from the previous models. In all
other models, we observe stability of the coe¢ cient for the consumption growth
and second moments dynamics. Here, the coe¢ cients change signicantly.
Figure 10 presents the expected excess returns given by the unconstrained
model and by the restricted model. We observe a rank correlation of -0.07,
which is statistically not signicant. In addition, the estimation of the con-
strained model gives us the following parameters
q  = 91:07 and q+ =  38:40
These two coe¢ cients are not signicantly di¤erent in statistical terms from
each other, which makes it di¢ cult to infer a value for the utility parameter
 (cf. Appendix C). The unconstrained model give us ' = 0:9593, whereas
the constrained model gives ' ' 1 which corresponds to a model where the
reference level is equal to the present consumption.
4.9 Tests on the excess returns dynamic
As section 2.3 explains, it is possible to use a formal test to check if the
evolution of the expected returns follows that predicted by one particular
model. For this purpose, I test the set of restrictions, g0A = 0, using a Wald
test and a Likelihood ratio test. The results are displayed in Table 7.
The results clearly show that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected for the
CRRA model and for the external habit formation model. Therefore, the path
implied by these models does not formally correspond to the observed evo-
lution. The internal habit formation model and the loss aversion model with
a reference level based on past consumption are accepted at a 1% condence
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Table 6
Estimated loss aversion model B
Unconstrained model 3
Rt ct V
1
t V
2
t Covt
c 0.0149 0.0029** 6.70e-5** 1.84e-5 1.40e-5
Rt 1 -0.0223 0.0240**
ct 1 0.5159 -0.1943**
V 1t 1 3.4726 0.8566**
V 2t 1 223.8821 0.1874**
Covt 1 -323.9910 0.4006**
"Rt 1
2
-0.8172 0.1111**
"ct 1
2
0.3169 0.2609** .
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 -43.0290 0.1702**
t 0.0011
tCovt 1 -11.6878
t"
R
t 1"
c
t 1 -2.6755
Log likelihood 2830.753
Constrained model
c 0.0035* 8.34e-5 3.68e-5 5.25e-5
Rt 1 -0.0243
ct 1 -0.1256
V 1t 1 0.8592
V 2t 1 0.2013
Covt 1 0.4159
"Rt 1
2
0.1055
"ct 1
2
0.2568
"Rt 1"
c
t 1 0.1646
Log likelihood 2818.584
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level. V 1t = Vt(Rt+1), V
2
t = Vt(ct+1)
and Covt = Covt(Rt+1;ct+1)
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Table 7
Test for the di¤erent models
Wald test Likelihood Ratio test
Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value
Constant relative risk aversion 24.1077 0.0022 21.2745 0.0065
Internal habit formation 17.1301 0.0166 14.8338 0.0382
External habit formation 29.1585 0.0021 35.3325 0.0002
Loss aversion A 17.8322 0.1209 22.4083 0.0332
Loss aversion B 23.3300 0.0251 24.4598 0.0176
* (**) denotes that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at the 5% (1% ) condence level.
level by both tests. The loss aversion model with a reference level dened by
the expected consumption is not rejected at a 10% condence level by the
Wald test and at a 1% condence level by the Likelihood ratio test. On the
basis of these tests, the loss aversion model with expected consumption seems
to be the one which is the most adequate to the observed evolution of excess
return. It is, however, still rejected by the likelihood test at a 5% condence
level. The internal habit formation model and the loss aversion model based
on past consumption are the next plausible candidates, but they are both
rejected at a 5% condence level. Finally, the constant relative risk-aversion
model and the external habit formation model are strongly rejected.
5 Conclusion
The results of the estimated linear SDF models show that the constant rel-
ative risk-aversion model and the external habit model are strongly rejected
by the data. The theoretical excess returns generated by these models do not
correspond to the observed evolution. I also nd evidence that the conditional
covariance between excess returns and consumption growth is negatively re-
lated to excess returns, which contradicts theses two models. This nding is
in-line with Du¤ee (2005) results. Finally, the constraints implied by constant
relative risk aversion and external habit formation are formally rejected by
both the Wald and the likelihood ratio tests. The validity of the loss aversion
model using past consumption as reference level is also doubtful. Although
its restrictions cannot be rejected at a 1% condence level, the values of the
estimated parameters cast some doubt on it.
On the basis of these conclusion, two candidates remain for explaining the
excess return path: the internal habit formation model and the loss-aversion
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model with expected consumption as reference level. Neither model can be
rejected at a 1% condence level and they have plausible parameters. My
preference lies with the loss-aversion model because the Wald test does not
reject its constraints at a 10% level, whereas the internal habit formation
model is rejected at a 5% level by both tests. This suggests that loss-aversion
models do play a role in the expected excess returns movements and that they
might be a suitable answer to the equity premium puzzle. Consequently, the
loss-aversion component should be included in the consumption-based model
in this context. Note that the results presented here also conrm those of Chen
and Ludvigson (2004), who nd that the data are better described by internal
habit formation than by external habit formation.
One interesting follow-up to this paper would be to use the VAR-GARCH-M
framework to test the original specication of the loss-aversion model, where
the loss function is dened on wealth rather than on consumption. If the
change in wealth better explains the data, then we should remember Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2001) justication for using wealth, and study "feelings
unrelated to consumption" (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001, p. 6) to un-
derstand the factors driving the expected excess returns. Without looking too
far away from the original consumption-based model, the results presented
here suggest that consumption growth variance, i.e. the uncertainty about
consumption, might play a role in the excess return evolution. This factor
does not appear in any of the proposed models and thus might constitute a
starting point for developing a more adequate model.
A Approximation for linear combinations of logarithms
A.1 Logarithm of a sum
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) show that we can approximate the log-
arithm of a sum by the sum of logarithms. First consider
ln (A+B) = lnA

1 +
B
A

= a+ ln

1 + eb a

(A.1)
where a = lnA and b = lnB. The second part of this equation can be
approximated by a standard Taylor approximation around its mean. Dene
x = b   a and f (x) = ln (1 + ex) The Taylor approximation yields f (x) 
f (x) + f 0 (x) (x  x) with f 0 (x) = ex= (1 + ex). Plugging this into equation
(A.1) gives the nal result
ln (A+B) ' + a+ (1  ) b (A.2)
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with  = 1= (1 + ex) and  =   ln    (1  ) ln (1=  1). We have that
0 <  < 1
A.2 Logarithm of a subtraction
Similarly for a subtraction, we have that
ln (A B) = lnA

1  B
A

= a+ ln

1  eb a

(A.3)
Dene g (x) = ln (1  ex) which implies g0 (x) =   ex
1 ex and thus
ln (A B) ' & +  a  (   1) b (A.4)
with  = 1= (1  ex) and & =   ln   (1   ) ln (1  1= ). Note that this
approximation is possible only if A B > 0, which implies that b  a < 0 and
thus  > 1.
B Linearisation of the internal habit marginal utility
From the denition of the habit level in equation (5), we can compute the
derivative of the habit with respect to consumption:
@Ht+i
@Ct
=
8><>: iHt+iC
 1
t if i  k
0 if i > k
(B.1)
Plugging this into equation (16)
U 0 (Ct) = (Ct  Ht)   
kX
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+iC 1t (B.2)
The rst order condition of the C-CAPM states that the marginal utility of
consumption is equal to the Lagrangian of the maximisation problem. The
Lagrangian is equal to the marginal utility of relaxing the budget constraints
by one unit, which corresponds to the marginal utility of one additional unit of
initial wealth. By denition, this marginal utility is always positive, which im-
plies that the marginal utility of consumption is also positive and its logarithm
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exists. Taking the log of this di¤erence yields (see Appendix A)
lnU 0 (Ct) = &1    1 ln (Ct  Ht) + ( 1   1) ct  (B.3)
  ( 1   1) ln
kX
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i
The log of the sum in the last term can also be linearised with a Taylor rst
order approximation (see Appendix A). We have that
ln
1X
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i = (B.4)
= 1 + (1  1) (ln 0    ln (Ct  Ht) + ht)
+1 ln
1X
i=1
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i
Solving this equation forward yields
ln
1X
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i = (B.5)
=
kX
i=0
0@i 1Y
j=0
j
1A (i + (1  i) (i ln  + ln i    ln (Ct+i  Ht+i) + ht+i))
Collecting all constant terms in 00 yields
ln
1X
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i = 00+ (B.6)
+
kX
i=0
0@i 1Y
j=0
j
1A (1  i) (ht+i    ln (Ct+i  Ht+i))
Since, by denition, consumption is always greater than the habit, we can also
approximate the logarithm of the di¤erence between them
ln (Ct  Ht) = &2 +  2ct   ( 2   1)ht (B.7)
Taking the logarithm of equation (17) gives
ht = 0ct + 1ct 1 + :::+ kct k = L (; ct) (B.8)
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where L (; ct) is a linear combination of the vector  and ct which collects
the parameters 0; :::; k and the log consumption ct; :::; ct k. Combing the two
last equations gives
ln (Ct  Ht) = &2 +  2ct   ( 2   1)L (; ct) (B.9)
Plugging this results into equation (B.4) gives
ln
1X
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i = (B.10)
= 0  
kX
i=0
0@i 1Y
j=0
j
1A (1  i) ( 2ct+i   (1 +  ( 2   1))L (; ct+i))
This equation tells us that ln
P1
i=0 
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i is a linear function
of ct+i with for all i 2 [ k; k]. This can be simply rewritten as
ln
kX
i=0
i (Ct+i  Ht+i)  iHt+i = 0 +
kX
i= k
bict+i (B.11)
Finally combining this equation with equation (B.3) also gives a linear func-
tion:
lnU 0 (Ct) = +
kX
i= k
aict+i (B.12)
which implies that
mt+1 =
k+1X
i= k+1
aict+i (B.13)
C Linearisation of the loss aversion marginal utility
Rewriting equation (35) gives
w0 (Z) =
8><>:   ln (V (Ct)  V (Xt)) if Ct  Xtln     ln (V (Xt)  V (Ct)) if Ct < Xt (C.1)
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Since both V (Ct)   V (Xt) in the upper part of this equation and V (Xt)  
V (Ct) in the lower part of it are by denition positive, we can approximate
them with a Taylor approximation (cf. Appendix A). We get that
ln (V (Ct)  V (Xt)) = &3 +  3 lnV (Ct)  ( 3   1) lnV (Xt) (C.2)
if Ct  Xt and
ln (V (Xt)  V (Ct)) = &4 +  4 lnV (Xt)  ( 4   1) lnV (Ct) (C.3)
if Ct < Xt with
 3 = 1=

1  exp

lnV (Ct)  lnV (Xt)

 4 = 1=

1  exp

lnV (Xt)  lnV (Ct)

where lnV (A)  lnV (B) is the average over all A  B.
Using the fact that V () is a power utility function, we get that
lnV (Ct) = (1  ) ct   ln (1  ) (C.4)
lnV (Xt) = (1  )xt   ln (1  ) (C.5)
and
ln (V (Ct)  V (Xt)) = & 03 + (1  ) ( 3ct   ( 3   1)xt) (C.6)
ln (V (Xt)  V (Ct)) = & 04 + (1  ) ( 4xt   ( 4   1) ct) (C.7)
Plugging these last equations into equation (C.1) gives
u0 (Ct) =
8><>: k
+ + q+ct + p
+xt if ct  xt
k  + q ct + p xt if ct < xt
(C.8)
where
k+ = k   q& 03
q+ =   ( + q (1  ) 3)
p+ =  (1  ) q ( 3   1)
k  = k   q& 04 + q ln
q  =   ( + q (1  ) ( 4   1))
p  =  q (1  ) 4
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D Covariance with loss aversion function
Let us dene X and Y as two joint normally distributed random variables and
Z as a binary variable such as Z = 1 if Y < Y and 0 otherwise. The variable
B is a binary variable that takes value B  if Z = 1 and B+ otherwise. Let us
dene  as the probability that Z = 1 and  as the probability that Y = Y .
Let us start with the identity
Cov (X;BY ) = E (Cov (X;BY jZ)) + Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) (D.1)
The rst part of the right hand side of equation (D.1) is equal to
E (Cov (X;BY jZ)) =

B  + (1  )B+

Cov (X; Y ) (D.2)
To compute the second part, rst note that
E (BY jZ) = E (BjZ)E (Y jZ) + Cov (B; Y jZ) (D.3)
Since B is a constant when Z is known, then Cov (B; Y jZ) = 0 and
Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) = Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BjZ)E (Y jZ)) (D.4)
Then dene the two residuals ex = X   E (X) and ey = Y   E (Y ), which
implies that
E (XjZ) = E (X) + E (exjZ) (D.5)
E (Y jZ) = E (Y ) + E (eyjZ) (D.6)
Plugging these denitions into the previous equations yields
Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) = (D.7)
= Cov (E (X) + E (exjZ) ; E (BjZ) (E (Y ) + E (eyjZ)))
Since E (X) and E (Y ) are constant, this equation becomes
Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) = (D.8)
= E (Y )Cov (E (exjZ) ; E (BjZ)) + Cov (E (exjZ) ; E (BjZ)E (eyjZ))
Furthermore, using the fact that Cov (a; b) = E (ab) E (a)E (b) and that, by
the law of iterated expectations, E (E (exjZ)) = E (ex) = 0, we can simplify
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the previous equation to
Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) = (D.9)
= E (Y )E (E (exjZ)E (BjZ)) + E (E (exjZ)E (BjZ)E (eyjZ))
Developing the expectation term, we get
Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) = B E (exj 1) (E (Y ) + E (eyj 1))+ (D.10)
+(1  )B+E (exj 0) (E (Y ) + E (eyj 0))
For the next step, let us assume that X and Y jointly normally distributed.
This implies that
E (exj ey) = Cov (e
x; ey)
V (ey)
ey (D.11)
Taking the conditional expectation on Z yields
E (exjZ) = Cov (e
x; ey)
V (ey)
E (eyjZ) (D.12)
The last term of this equation is the expectation of a truncated normal dis-
tribution and is equal to (see Greene, 2000, p. 899)
E (eyjZ) =
8><>: V
1=2 (ey) 

if Z = 1
V 1=2 (ey) 
1  if Z = 0
(D.13)
which implies by plugging equations (D.12) and (D.13) into equation (D.10)
Cov (E (XjZ) ; E (BY jZ)) = (D.14)
= 
 
B+  B 
V 1=2 (ey)
E (Y ) + 
 
B+
1   +
B 

!!
Cov (ex; ey)
Finally, combining equations (D.2) and (D.14), we get the nal expression for
the covariance in equation (D.1)
Cov (X;BY ) = (D.15)
=
 

B+  B 
V 1=2 (ey)
E (Y ) +
2 + 2

B  +
(1  )2 + 2
1   B
+
!
Cov (ex; ey)
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Abstract
In the last decades, international nancial integration has markedly increased. This
paper analyses the impact of these developments on bankscommon exposure to
shocks and on banking sector systemic risk. Theoretically, this impact is ambiguous.
Empirically, we nd that bankscommon exposure to shocks has signicantly de-
creased until 2000 and rapidly increased afterwards. Systemic risk follows an entirely
di¤erent pattern with two peaks in 1998 and in 2002-2003. We provide evidence that
systemic risk is mainly driven by banksindividual risk-taking and that, contrary
to widespread belief, higher common exposures to risk do not necessarily induce
higher systemic risk.
Key words: Systemic risk, Co-movements, Banking sector.
JEL classication: F36, G15, G21.
? The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reect the views of the Swiss National Bank.
1 Introduction
Worldwide, the banking sector has gone through profound transformations in
the last few decades. Technical progress in nancial engineering and commu-
nications technologies as well as global deregulation policies have signicantly
modied the international nancial landscape. In Europe, the launch of the
euro has also helped to accelerate these changes (Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl,
Krylova, and Monnet, 2004). An obvious outcome of these developments is
a quickening in the pace with which international nancial markets are be-
ing integrated. Financial institutions large banks in particular now benet
from much easier access to a wider range of markets and nancial instruments.
These developments have led some observers to worry about a possible increase
in the systemic risk of the banking sector. Their main fear is that nancial in-
tegration increases direct inter-linkages between banks and also causes banks
to compete more and more on the same markets, exposing them to the same
risk factors. This common exposure to risks means that a downward shock
could impact on most of the banks simultaneously and thus trigger a systemic
crisis in the banking sector.
Although this concern is well founded, from a theoretical point of view it is not
clear that nancial integration automatically induces higher common exposure
to shocks. Neither is it clear that higher common exposure causes an increase
in systemic risk. On the one hand, a wider range of markets and nancial
tools o¤ers banks an opportunity to di¤erentiate themselves by implementing
their own specic business strategy. 1 Adopting di¤erent strategies reduces
the common exposure of two banks to shocks. Access to new markets and
new nancial techniques also o¤ers nancial institutions more opportunities
to manage and diversify their risks, which is benecial in terms of systemic
risk. On the other hand, easy access and low entry costs are likely to increase
the number of banks competing on the same market. Furthermore, intensied
cross-border linkages between banks increase the risk of contagion. Both ef-
fects bring about an increase in bankscommon exposure to shocks and are
relatively negative as regards systemic stability. To sum up, a higher level of
nancial integration gives rise to both positive and negative e¤ects in terms
of common exposure to shocks and systemic risk. The net e¤ect is ambigu-
ous. Furthermore, the link between common exposure and systemic risk is also
ambiguous. Indeed, a higher common exposure to shocks does not necessarily
imply higher systemic risk. An increase in common exposure can, for example,
1 Hellwig (1998) shows that banks have an incentive to specialise rather than diver-
sify in order to reduce their monitoring costs. Winton (1999) and Stomper (2006)
show that both specialised and diversied banks can coexist in equilibrium. Fecht,
Grüner, and Hartmann (2007) show that the improvements in risk sharing induced
by integrated nancial markets can lead banks to specialise on a given market.
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be compensated by a decrease in bankstotal exposure, causing the overall
systemic risk to decrease. This situation occurs, for example, when two banks
switch from independent risky strategies (no common exposure, very high in-
dividual risk) to a common safe strategy (complete common exposure, but a
very low risk).
In this paper, we try to clarify these theoretical ambiguities on the basis of an
investigation using empirical data encompassing a panel of large international
banks over a period running from 1993 through to 2006. Specically, we pose
the following questions: (1) what was the impact of international nancial
integration on bankscommon exposure to shocks between 1993 and 2006?
(2) What was the impact of international integration on systemic risk in the
international banking sector between 1993 and 2006? (3) Is there an empirical
link between common exposure to shocks and systemic risk during the period
under consideration?
To estimate the impact of international integration on common exposure, we
analyse the way in which the co-movement i.e. correlation of banksasset-
to-debt ratios (AD ratios henceforth) changes. AD ratios sum up banksassets
and liabilities as well as their interrelationship. Changes in the AD ratio can
thus be considered a good summary of changes in the overall nancial health
of the banks. A high correlation between AD ratios suggests that both banks
are similarly a¤ected by shocks and, thus, that they have a high common
exposure to shocks.
To estimate the impact of international integration on systemic risk, we com-
pute a systemic risk index based on Lehar (2005), and study its changes during
the period 1993-2006. Lehars index measures the probability of observing a
systemic crisis dened as the simultaneous defaults of a given proportion of
banks in the banking sector at a given point in time. Finally, we investigate
whether there is a link between movements in bankscommon exposure (i.e.
the correlation between AD ratios) and systemic risk.
Several studies have analysed correlations between variables relating to banks.
De Nicolò and Kwast (2002) nd a signicant rise in stock return correlations
between large US banking institutions during the 1990s. In a similar study for
the European Union, Schröder and Schüler (2003) show that the correlations
between 13 national bank stock indices have risen signicantly in recent years.
Brasili and Vulpes (2005) draw a similar conclusion when studying the correla-
tions between distance-to-defaults for European banks. Hawkesby, Marsh, and
Stevens (2007) analyse the correlations between equity returns (and between
premiums for credit default swaps) of large and complex nancial institutions
(LCFI) in Europe and the US. The general conclusion from these studies is
that co-movement between banks has increased in the last decade, which sug-
gests that banks are increasingly exposed to the same risk factors. Most of
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these studies conjectured that the observed increase in co-movements leads to
higher systemic risk.
Our paper di¤ers from the previous studies in two ways: Firstly, we use a
new method based on Ledoit, Santa-Clara, and Wolf (2003) to estimate the
joint dynamic of the AD ratios as a whole (i.e. for all banks at the same time),
whereas previous studies concentrated on the dynamic between pairs of banks.
The resulting time-varying covariance matrix can then be used directly in the
computation of the systemic risk index as well as for computing the evolution
of correlation between banks. Secondly, and this is our main contribution,
we study in detail the link between common exposure and systemic risk. We
assess whether a higher common exposure to shocks (i.e. higher correlation)
is associated with higher or lower systemic risk, or whether it plays no role
in systemic risk. As mentioned before, other studies have often claimed that
higher correlation yields to higher systemic risk, without formally verifying
this assumption.
The main results of our analysis are the following. Firstly, we nd that the
correlation between banksAD ratios decreases in the rst part of the sample
period, and increases after 2000. This suggests that, before 2000, banks spe-
cialised and thus reduced their common exposure to shocks rather than
diversifying their portfolios in response to changes in the banking sector envi-
ronment. After 2000, however, the banks appear to have become increasingly
similar and their common exposure has risen. This nding holds for the whole
sample as well as for di¤erent regional sub-groups (namely North America and
European Union). However, the degree of common exposure di¤ers between
these groups. Correlations between North American banks tend to be higher
than between their European counterparts. Co-movements between US and
European banks are far less pronounced than within each regional sub-group,
suggesting that these two groups are (at least partially) exposed to di¤erent
shocks.
Secondly, as opposed to the correlation analysis, we do not nd any signicant
trend in the systemic risk index. The latter is rather characterised by two
peaks, one at the end of 1998 and the other at the end of 2002 and the
beginning of 2003. These two periods correspond to two well-known episodes
of high stress levels a¤ecting the banking sector: the LTCM and Russian crisis
at the end of 1998 and a persistent downturn on the stock market in 2002-2003.
Taking a closer look at individual sub-groups, we nd that the high level of
systemic risk in 2002-2003 was mainly attributable to the fact that European
banks were also su¤ering from the poor economic conditions in the European
economy.
Thirdly, our results point out that correlation between banks is not a reli-
able measure of systemic risk. The link between correlation and our systemic
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risk index is weak and its direction can change, depending on the period con-
sidered. The distance-to-default, by contrast, which is a combination of the
volatility and level of the AD ratio, turns out to be a very reliable explana-
tory factor with respect to the systemic risk index. In other words, systemic
risk seems to be the consequence of each banks individual risk taking (i.e.
its distance-to-default), rather than of all bankscommon exposure to shocks
(correlation). This nding warns us against viewing systemic risk as a pure
correlation phenomenon and highlights the danger of high and volatile lever-
age at the individual bank level. Note, however, that once the e¤ects of the
distance-to-default are taken into account, we nd that correlation is positively
associated with systemic risk. In other words, for a given level of individual
risk, a higher common exposure implies a higher systemic risk.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the methodology used to
estimate the correlation dynamics and the systemic risk index. The data used
is described in Section 3. Section 4 studies the correlation dynamics between
large international banksAD ratios. Section 5 presents the estimated systemic
risk index and compares its evolution with the correlation dynamics. Section
6 gives our conclusions and recommendations for banking sector supervisors.
2 Methodology
As mentioned in the previous section, we need two ingredients to answer the
questions at the centre of this paper: the evolution of the correlations between
banksAD ratios and the evolution of the systemic risk index. To get them,
we proceed in four steps: (1) we make some assumptions on bank asset and
debt dynamics, (2) we use these assumptions to recover the AD ratios from
observable equity and debt data using Mertons method, 2 (3) we estimate the
joint dynamic of the AD ratios, including the dynamic of their covariances,
using a multivariate GARCH model and (4) we use the estimated dynamic to
compute the systemic risk index. The next four sections describe these steps
in details. In addition, the next section shows why shocks to AD ratios sum
up both shocks to bank assets and debts as well as their e¤ects on each others.
2.1 Asset and debt dynamic
The AD ratio is dened as the ratio between the asset market value of a bank
and its debt face value. Unfortunately, asset market values are not directly
2 The AD ratios are not directly observable because the asset market value is not
directly observable.
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observable, but, following Merton (1974), they can be estimated by modelling
banks equity as a call option on banks assets. However, to recover the AD
ratios from observed equity prices with Mertons technique, we have to assume
that asset market values and debt face values follow a multivariate Itô process
such as 264dAt
dDt
375 =
264At 0
0 Dt
375
264A
D
375 dt+
264At 0
0 Dt
375
264AA AD
DA DD
375
264dwA
dwD
375 (1)
We have that dAt and dDt are (N  1) vectors containing the instantaneous
change in assets Ait and debts D
i
t of all banks, respectively. N is the number
of banks. At and Dt are (N N) matrices containing the assets Ait and the
debts Dit in their respective diagonals, all other elements being zeros. A and
D are (N  1) vectors regrouping the constant instantaneous growth rate of
banksassets and debts, respectively. dwA and dwD (N  1) are vectors of
independent Wiener processes. They represent the individual shocks to assets
and debts of each bank at time t. Finally AA, AB, BA and BB are
(N N) matrices which regroup the instantaneous responses of assets and
debts to the di¤erent shocks. For example, ijAD (the ij-th element of AD)
is the instantaneous response of the bank i asset value to a shock in bank j
debt.
The diagonals of the matrices AA and DD are the direct responses of the
banks assets and debt to their own shocks. The diagonal of the matrix AD
(DA) is the direct response of a banks assets (debt) to a shock a¤ecting its
own debt (assets). All other elements are the indirect responses of a banks
assets and debt to shocks a¤ecting other banksassets and debt. They rep-
resent the contagion e¤ects between banks through interlinkages. Note that
we do not assume any symmetrical response between banks or between asset
and debts. For example, the correlation between assets and debt can be dif-
ferent according to whether the shock a¤ects the assets or the debt. Similarly,
the response of bank i to a shock to bank j can be di¤erent from a bank js
response to bank is shock.
Without loss of generality (see Appendix A), we can rewrite equation (1) in
the reduced form
dzt = dt+dw (2)
where
0 = 

zt is the (N  1) vector regrouping the log AD ratios zit = ln (Ait=Dit),  is a
(N  1) vector of instantaneous drifts in log AD ratios and 
 is the (N N)
variance-covariance matrix between instantaneous changes in log AD ratios.
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As shown in Appendix A, the matrix  sums up all interactions between
banksassets and debts.
2.2 Recovering AD ratios from equity prices
Merton (1974) suggested to model banks equity as a call option on banks
assets to compute the banks default probability estimated by market partici-
pants. This method can also be used to recover the banks AD ratio from the
equity price. Mertons method is based on the fact that if, at debts maturity
time t+T , the value of the banks assets is smaller than its debt (Ait+T < D
i
t+T ),
then it is not rational for the shareholders to exercise the option, i.e., they will
make the bank default. If the bank defaults, then the value of the equity is
zero. Thus Mertons model states that the value of bank is equity at time
t+ T is:
Eit+T = max

Ait+T  Dit+T ; 0

(3)
where Eit is the banks stock price.
An equity with such payo¤s is similar to an exchange option 3 . If both the
assets and the debt are log normally distributed, as stated in Equation (1),
then the option initial value can easily be computed and is equal to (Margrabe,
1978):
Eit = A
i
t (d1) Dit (d2) (4)
with
d1 =
zit +

2zit
=2

T
zit
p
T
d2 = d1   zit
p
T
where  () is the cumulative normal distribution and 2zit is the conditional
variance of the log AD ratio. Dividing both sides of Equation (4) by Dit yields
X it = Z
i
t (d1)   (d2) (5)
where X it is the equity-to-debt ratio of bank i at time t and Z
i
t is its AD ratio
at time t. Using Itôs lemma, we have that
xitX
i
t = zitZ
i
t (d1) (6)
where 2xit is the conditional variance of the log equity-to-debt ratio.
Bank is debt Dit and equity price E
i
t are directly observable. With them, we
3 Exchange options are sometimes also referred to as options to exchange one asset
for another.
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can form the equity-to-debt ratio X it and compute its conditional variance 
2
xit
.
With X it and xit known, we are left with two unknown variables in Equation
(5) and (6): the AD ratio Zit and its conditional variance zit . The AD ratio
Zit can be recovered by simultaneously solving Equation (5) and (6) using a
numerical iterative process. 4 , 5
Note that this method gives the correct AD ratio only if the market par-
ticipants correctly interpret the information they have about the banks. In
particular, they should understand correctly the inter-dependence between
banks and integrate it in their valuation. Note also that this method is not
the only one that can be used to recover the AD ratio. 6 However, Hovakimian
and Kane (2000) show that the di¤erences in the AD ratio valuations given
by di¤erent methods are small.
2.3 Estimation of the AD ratio joint dynamics
The next step is to estimate the dynamic process in Equation (2) with em-
pirical data. We choose to model the AD ratio dynamic with a multivariate
GARCH model (M-GARCH). The main advantage of this kind of model is
that it allows for time-varying variances and covariances. This is necessary in
our context since we are interested in the evolution of the correlation through
time.
The equivalent of Equation (2) in discrete time is:
zt = z + ut
ut  N (0;Ht)
where zt is a (N  1) vector containing the changes in log AD ratios zit, z
is a (N  1) vector of constants, ut is a (N  1) vector of white noise residu-
als and Ht denotes the (N N) conditional variance-covariance matrix of the
4 Note that only the "marginal" variance of the equity-to-debt ratios is necessary
to recover the AD ratios. In particular, this technique does not require to know the
correlations between the banks equities (see Zhou, 2001, for another illustration
with a bivariate model). Therefore, this technique can be applied separately to each
bank.
5 Other techniques are available to recover the market asset value. Duan (1994)
estimates it by maximizing a likelihood function. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use an
iterative process that does not require equation (6).
6 See for example, Bichsel and Blum (2004) for a model without stochastic debt,
Ronn and Verma (1986) for a model with forbearance or Saunders and Wilson
(1995) for a model with an innite-maturity put.
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residuals. We use the diagonal Vech model (Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge,
1988) specication for the dynamic of Ht. In this model, the conditional co-
variance hijt between bank i and bank j depends only on the past covariance
and the past residuals:
hijt = !ij + iju
i
t 1u
j
t 1 + ijh
ij
t 1 (7)
The model has the property that when two banks experience trouble at the
same time, their correlation increases and they will tend to move together
in the future. This property is important as it captures the empirical nding
that the correlation between banks seems to increase during bad periods. Yet,
correlation will also increase when both banks are hit by a positive shock; i.e.,
the covariances behave symetrically.
In matrix form, Equation (7) has the following representation
Ht = C+A
 ut 1u0t 1 +B
Ht 1 (8)
where the coe¢ cient matrices C, A and B are (N N) matrices regroup-
ing the parameters !ij, ij and ij, respectively. The symbol 
 denotes the
Hadamar product of two matrices. 7 The covariance matrix Ht has some dis-
tinctive characteristics to be respected by the estimation method. First, Ht is
symmetric implying that C, A and B must also be symmetric. Secondly, Ht
is a positive semidenite matrix and thus, any estimation of it must also be
positive semidenite.
A natural way to estimateHt and the coe¢ cient matricesC,A andB seems to
use maximum likelihood estimates as it is usually done for univariate GARCH
models. Unfortunately, this is not feasible because (i) the parameters are too
numerous and so intricately linked that existing optimization algorithms do
usually not converge, and (ii) maximum likelihood estimation does not neces-
sarily give positive semidenite covariance matrices. To cope with this second
problem, econometricians usually impose additional conditions on the model
coe¢ cients to ensure that the matrix Ht is positive semidenite. 8 In addition
to the fact that such restrictions might not make sense from an economic point
of view, Kroner and Ng (1998) have shown that M-GARCH results are very
sensitive to di¤erent specications.
We choose to follow a di¤erent approach to estimate the coe¢ cient matricesC,
7 The Hadamar product is the elementwise product of two matrices: U 
 V =
(uijvij).
8 See Ding and Engle (2001) for a recent comparison of the restrictions used by
di¤erent models.
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A and B: the Flexible M-GARCH method developed by Ledoit, Santa-Clara,
andWolf (2003). This procedure has the advantage to solve both problems pre-
viously mentioned without imposing a priori restrictions on the coe¢ cients. It
is based on a decentralized estimation of the coe¢ cients. Ledoit et al. propose
to estimate the coe¢ cient matrices C, A and B in two steps. In the rst step,
each coe¢ cient of the matrix is independently estimated with a univariate or
bivariate GARCH model. Thus, the estimation of a large matrix is reduced
to several univariate and bivariate problems for which conventional univariate
and bivariate GARCH estimation techniques are easy to apply. As indicated
above, the resulting estimated coe¢ cient matrices C^, A^ and B^ will not neces-
sarily ensure the variance-covariance matrix to be positive semidenite. Thus,
in a second step, Ledoit et al. apply a result from Ding and Engle (2001) sta-
ting that positive semidenite coe¢ cient matrices are a su¢ cient condition to
yield (almost surely) a positive semidenite variance-covariance matrix. The
second part of the procedure is thus to nd the positive semidenite matrices
~C, ~A and ~B that are the closest to the C^, A^ and B^ initial matrices. 9 The
coe¢ cient matrices ~C, ~A and ~B given by the Flexible M-GARCH estimation
are then used to compute the conditional variance-covariance dynamic with
Equation (7) and, in the next step, to compute the systemic risk index.
2.4 Construction of the systemic risk index
Our systemic risk index follows Lehar (2005). The index is an estimation of
the probability of a systemic banking crisis at time t. In this paper, a systemic
crisis is dened as follows:
Denition 1 A systemic crisis occurs when a percentage  of the banking
system becomes insolvent within the next k periods.
Denition 1 requires another denition, which species under which conditions
a bank defaults.
Denition 2 The bank i defaults if the market value Ait of its assets falls
below the face value Dit of its debt within the next k periods (i.e. A
i
t+j < D
i
t+j
for at least one j 2 [0; k] or equivalently Zit+j < 1 for at least one j 2 [0; k]).
Given Denitions 1 and 2, the systemic risk index can be expressed as:
It () = Pr
"
NX
i=1
itb
i
t > 
#
(9)
9 The positive semidenite matrice X, which is the closest from the initial matrice
Y, can be found by using a simple algorithm developped by Sharapov (1997).
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where N is the number of banks, it is the weight
10 of bank i in the banking
system at time t and
bit =
8><>: 1 if A
i
t+j < D
i
t+j for at least one j 2 [0; k]
0 otherwise
bit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank i goes bankrupt in the
next k periods. There are various ways to determine a banks weight it in the
banking sector (e.g. equal weight, proportion of a banks assets in the total
banking sectors assets, proportion of a banks interbank deposits in the total
system, etc.). We chose to give an equal weight to each bank.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compute analytically the probability of
a systemic crisis. To estimate it, we proceed with a Monte-Carlo simulation
based on the estimated AD ratio joint dynamics described in section 2.3. An
alternative would have been to use approximation techniques such as the one
proposed by Carmona and Durrleman (2006). The Monte-Carlo simulation,
yet, has the advantage of being easier and faster to implement and more
exible for further developments (e.g. modication of the dynamic or explicit
modelling of contagion e¤ects). A description of the simulation algorithm to
estimate the systemic risk index is given in Appendix B. We set k = 12 (one
year) in this paper.
3 Data
The data needed to compute the correlation between AD ratios and to con-
struct the systemic risk index consist of individual banksbalance sheet data
(debt) and market information (equity prices). Data on debt is taken from
Bloomberg while equity prices stem from Datastream. As data on debt is not
available on a monthly basis, quarterly and for some banks yearly data
have been transformed into monthly data by linear interpolation.
We constructed two di¤erent datasets. The rst dataset comprises monthly
data on 27 large international banks fromNovember 1992 until June 2006 (long
sample). 11 The second dataset (short sample) comprises data on a total of 39
large international banks including the 27 institutions already represented
in the rst dataset from June 1997 until June 2006. 12
10 The individual weights are normalized such that
PN
i=1 i = 1.
11 The long sample consists of banks from: Germany (3), France (1), Italy (2),
Netherlands (2), Spain (2), Sweden (2), Switzerland (1), UK (3), USA (2), Canada
(5), Australia (4).
12 The short sample consists of banks from: Belgium (3), Germany (3), France (2),
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4 Common exposure to shocks
To get an idea of how bankscommon exposure to shocks has evolved in time,
we try to identify a potential common trend in AD ratio correlations between
pairs of banks. A high AD ratio correlation indicates that two banks are both
equally a¤ected by a shock, i.e., that they have a high common exposure to
shocks. Thus, if we observe a common upward trend in all correlations, we can
conclude that, in the aggregate, bankscommon exposure has increased and
that banks have become more similar.
We can get a rst idea on the trend in correlation by observing the evolution
of the average correlation (cf Figure 1). In both samples, the average corre-
lation decreases until about 2000 and then increases regularly. This pattern
is also observed in the average correlation between pairs of North American
banks, pairs of European Union banks and between pairs of banks from each
sub-group. This is a rst indication that, in the aggregate, bankscommon
exposure to shocks has decreased until about 2000 and then increased.
To study more precisely this hypothesis, we estimate the common trend to all
correlations in a panel data analysis. We then test for a break in the slope of
the common trend. Concretely, we estimated the following system of equations
yijt =  + t+ u
ij + "ijt (10)
where yijt is a logit transformation 13 of the correlation between bank i and
j at time t,  is the average (logit) correlation,  is the slope of the common
trend, uij is a xed e¤ect particular to each pair and "ijt is a independant
heteroskedastic error term, which is normally distributed with variance 2ij.
We then test the hypothesis of a break at time t0 in the slope  of the trend.
We used the test developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) which simultane-
ously estimates the most probable break date and then tests if the break is
statistically signicant. The results are presented in Table 1.
The estimated break dates lie between August 1999 and June 2000 (with an
exception of a break date of November 2001 for the North American banks
in the short sample). It indicates that a change in bankscommon exposure
occurred around the beginning of this century. Before this date, the trends are
negative, which implies that the common exposure to shocks had a tendency
Italy (3), Netherlands (2), Spain (2), Sweden (2), Switzerland (1), UK (5), USA (7),
Canada (5), Australia (4).
13More precisely, yijt = ln

qijt =

1  qijt

where qijt = (cor (i; j) + 1) =2. This
transformation insure that yijt is distributed over ] 1; +1[ whereas the correlation
is bounded between  1 and 1.
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Fig. 1. Correlation between AD ratios (left: long sample, right: short sample)
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to decrease. This suggests that, during this period, banks have rather chosen
to specialize than to diversify their portofolios. After 2000, the trends reverse
and common exposure to shocks increases, hinting at increasing similarities or
interdependencies between banks. An increase in banksco-movements since
1999 is also documented by Brasili and Vulpes (2005).
This trend reverse is observed in both regions and between these regions. Fig-
ure 2 displays the estimated trend for correlation between North American
banks, between EU banks and between banks of each region. 14 Except for the
end of the sample, the correlation between North American banks is higher
than between EU banks. North American banks seem to be more commonly
exposed to shocks, or more homogeneous, than EU banks. The correlation be-
tween EU and North American banks is the lowest, indicating that banks from
di¤erent regions are less commonly exposed to shocks or more heterogeneous.
This result is in line with Hawkesby, Marsh, and Stevens (2007), who nd a
high degree of heterogeneity between both sub-groups and a higher correla-
tion between US banks. Note nally that the slope of the EU banks is steeper
14 The trend for the short sample are not presented here but can be obtained by the
authors. The conclusions are similar.
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Table 1
Test for a break in the common trend and estimated slopes of the trend
Region supF p-value Break date   before  after
-stat date break break
19
93
-2
00
6 World 1604.05 <1% 2000.04 0.5918 -0.0034 0.0033
EU 491.46 <1% 1999.12 0.6742 -0.0043 0.0040
North America 100.82 <1% 2000.06 0.6845 -0.0031 0.0026
Cross 362.65 <1% 2000.01 0.5593 -0.0032 0.0028
19
97
-2
00
6 World 644.99 <1% 1999.10 0.2488 -0.0026 0.0027
EU 114.28 <1% 1999.08 0.2308 -0.0025 0.0027
North America 199.37 <1% 2001.11 0.3084 -0.0011 0.0049
Cross 276.64 <1% 1999.12 0.2698 -0.0028 0.0030
All co e¢ cients are signcant at a 1% condence level. A supF-statistics greater than 16.64 ind icates that the null
hypothesis of no break is rejected at a 1% condence level.
Fig. 2. Estimated common trends in AD ratios correlation (long sample, in logit
tranformed units)
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in both phases. EU banks have specialized more strongly during the pre-2000
period and then have become more similar than North American banks, to the
point that the correlation between EU banks seems higher now than between
US banks.
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5 Evolution of systemic risk
Do the changes observed in the banking industry in the past years have any
impact on systemic risk? In particular, does the increase in common exposure
to shocks observed since 2000 generate a higher systemic risk? To answer these
questions, we constructed a set of indices of systemic risk. These indices are
based on Lehar (2005). They reect the probability to observe a systemic crisis
in the banking sector (cf. Section 2.4). We computed a global systemic risk
index for all the banks in our sample and two regional sub-indices, one for
North American banks and one for EU banks. For all three regions (World,
North America, EU), we computed two indices: one for which a default of
10% of the banking sector triggers a crisis, one for which 20% of the banking
sector must default to trigger a crisis. We computed these 6 indices for both
samples (long and short samples), which makes a total of 12 systemic risk
indices. These indices are presented in Figure 3.
The global index points out two periods of high systemic risk: at the end of
1998 and at end 2002 until beginning 2003. These two episodes correspond
to the LTCM and Russian crisis in 1998 and to the stock market downturn
in 2002-2003. The systemic risk during the rest of the sample is less acute.
The 1998 peak is observed in both the US and the EU sub-indexes. The EU
banks seem to have been more a¤ected than the North American banks in
2002-2003, probably because they were also facing bad economic conditions at
that time. In the US banking system, a period of higher systemic risk is also
observed in 1994-1995, which translates by a slightly higher systemic risk in
the global index.
5.1 Trends in the systemic risk index
A quick look at Figure 3 suggests that the path of the systemic risk index
is very di¤erent from the evolution of banks common exposure to shocks
presented in Figure 1. The latter has a distinct V-shape, whereas the former
is characterized by two peaks of higher systemic risk for the banking sector.
This visual impression is conrmed when we try to t a trend with a break
at the beginning of 2000 (which corresponds to the break date observed in
the correlation trend) to the systemic risk index. The results of this regression
are presented in Table 2. Since the index is a probability bounded between 0
and 1, we estimate the coe¢ cients with a logit regression using weighted least
squares as suggested by Greene (2000). 15
Most indices do not display any signicant trend. Only the global and the
15All regressions in this section are made using this method.
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Fig. 3. Systemic risk index (left: long sample, right: short sample)
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North American systemic risk indices seem to have signicantly decreased
before 2000 in the long sample and after 2000 in the short sample, respectively.
Furthermore, no signicant break date is detected by the Bai and Perron test
for any of the indices. This result contrasts with the unambiguous trends and
breaks observed in the AD ratio correlation: While a clear V-shaped trend
appears in the dynamic of bankscommon exposure to shocks, no apparent
trend is detected in the systemic risk indexpattern . Moreover, the slope of
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Table 2
Trend in the systemic risk index
Index Trend Trend
before 2000 after 2000
19
93
-2
00
6
World 10% -0.0196** 0.0109
World 20% -0.0233** 0.0034
North America 10% 0.0075 -0.0110
North America 20% 0.0018 -0.0079
EU 10% 0.0031 0.0019
EU 20% 0.0022 0.0142
19
93
-2
00
6
World 10% -0.0151 -0.0076
World 20% -0.0435 0.0012
North America 10% -0.0223 -0.0343**
North America 20% -0.0397 -0.0118**
EU 10% -0.0120 -0.0030
EU 20% -0.0299 -0.0004
* (**) ind icates that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at a 5% (1% ) condence
level. The p ercentage asso ciated to each index corresp onds to the prop ortion
of the banking system that need to defau lt to trigger a crisis (e.g .World 10%
corresp onds to the system ic risk index for which a 10% of the banking system
has to defau lt to trigger a crisis).
the signicant trend observed after 2000 for the North American systemic risk
index does not correspond to the sign that one would a priori expect (i.e. the
systemic risk decreases whereas the common exposure to shocks increases).
Many other studies record similar results as ours for bankscommon exposure
to shocks or banksco-movements. Most of them conclude, without explicitly
checking it, that an increase in co-movements induces a higher systemic risk.
However, given our results for the systemic risk index, the existence of the
link between co-movements or common exposure to shocks and systemic risk
is ambiguous. The next section studies this question in more details.
5.2 Are common exposure and systemic risk related?
The results of the previous section raise questions about the existence of a
link between bankscommon exposure to shock (i.e. AD ratio correlations)
and systemic risk in the banking sector. Do common exposures really play a
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role for systemic risk? How can we interpret a change in common exposure in
terms of systemic risk? Considering the construction of the systemic risk index
(see Section 2.4), it is obvious that three elements determine its value: 1) the
correlation structure between banksAD ratios, 2) the volatilities of the AD
ratios and 3) the level of the AD ratios. While the rst component captures
the systemic characteristics of a banking sector, the last two components are
bank-specic. Combined in the distance-to-default 16 , they describe banks
individual risk taking. The systemic risk index is a function of these systemic
and bank-specic dimensions. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact form
of this function. We can guess though that it is likely to be non linear.
To get an idea about each factors inuence on the systemic risk index, we com-
pute the rank correlation between the systemic risk index and (i) the banks
AD ratio correlations and (ii) the banksdistance-to-default. The rank corre-
lation statistics are preferred to the traditional (linear) correlation (Pearson
coe¢ cient) because they measure the link between two variables independently
of the form taken by the function linking them. We use both the Spearman
rank-order correlation coe¢ cient and the Kendall measure of correlation to
compute the rank correlation. 17 We start by computing the rank correla-
tion between the average correlation (or, alternatively, between the average
distance-to-default) and the systemic risk index. Note, however, that it is di¢ -
cult to adequately reect the complete correlation structure (or the complete
distance-to-default structure) in one single measure such as the average. In
particular, it is possible that the systemic risk index might be mainly inu-
enced by extreme values of correlations or distance-to-defaults (i.e., by banks
that are extremely commonly exposed or extremely close to default). To check
for that, we also use the 75% (25%) and the 90% (10%) percentiles of the
correlations (distance-to-defaults). The evolution of the average and centiles
of correlations and distance-to-defaults are displayed in Figure 4. The rank
correlation between the systemix risk index and these di¤erent measures are
presented in Table 3. 18
The results for the rank correlation show that the link between systemic risk
and bankscommon exposure (i.e. AD ratio correlation) is ambiguous. A pos-
itive relationship is identied in the long sample, while the same relationship
appears to be negative in the short sample. On the opposite, the link between
16 The distance-to-default is equal to the level of the AD ratio divided by its volatil-
ity.
17 Spearman rank-order correlation coe¢ cient measures the linear correlation be-
tween the ranks of each observation. Kendalls  is even more nonparametric since
it uses the relative ordering of the data, wihtout assuming any linear relation at any
point of its computation.
18We present the results for the World index only. The results for the regional
systemic risk indices can be obtained by the authors. The conclusions do not di¤er
from those presented here.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the AD correlations and the distance-to-defaults (left: long
sample, right: short sample)
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Mean
75% centile
90% centile
AD Correlation
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Mean
75% centile
90% centile
AD Correlation
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Mean
25% centile
10% centile
Distance-to-default
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Mean
25% centile
10% centile
Distance-to-default
systemic risk and distance-to-default is always negative. Moreover, the rank
correlation between systemic risk and distance-to-default is always stronger
than the one between systemic risk and common exposure. We thus draw the
following main conclusion: Low distance-to-default is a much stronger and
much more reliable sign of high systemic risk than high correlation. The e¤ect
of bankscommon exposure to shocks on systemic risk is weaker and can even
change direction depending on the period.
The strong link between distance-to-default and systemic risk is illustrated by
Figure 5, in which a logit transformation of the systemic risk index is plotted
against AD ratio correlation (left) and distance-to-default (right), respectively.
Clearly, the dispersion with the distance-to-default is smaller than with corre-
lation. Interestingly, with this transformation, the link between the systemic
risk and the distance-to-default seems to be relatively linear.
Table 4 presents the results of a linear regression of the (logit of the) systemic
risk index on the AD ratio correlation and on the distance-to-default, respec-
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Table 3
Rank correlation between the systemic risk index and di¤erent factors
Index Factor Correlation Distance-to-default
Spearman
coe¢ cient
Kendalls
tau
Spearman
coe¢ cient
Kendalls
tau
19
93
-2
00
6
W
or
ld
10
% Average 0.2369 0.1620 -0.8587 -0.6833
75% percentile 0.2874 0.1949 -0.8549 -0.6752
90% percentile 0.4291 0.2880 -0.9046 -0.7429
W
or
ld
20
% Average 0.3041 0.2254 -0.7880 -0.6379
75% percentile 0.3310 0.2464 -0.7553 -0.6093
90% percentile 0.4731 0.3518 -0.8008 -0.6470
19
97
-2
00
6
W
or
ld
10
% Average -0.3510 -0.2339 -0.9348 -0.7919
75% percentile -0.3424 -0.2319 -0.9375 -0.7976
90% percentile -0.3041 -0.2159 -0.8984 -0.7256
W
or
ld
20
% Average -0.0618 -0.0472 -0.7630 -0.5939
75% percentile -0.0579 -0.0429 -0.7730 -0.6097
90% percentile -0.0470 -0.0401 -0.6837 -0.5238
The fourth (fth) column gives the Sp earman (Kendall) co e¢ cient b etween di¤erent system ic risk ind ices and
the m ean, 75% centile and 90% centile of the correlation b etween banksAD ratio . The sixth (seventh) column
gives the Sp earman (Kendall) co e¢ cient b etween di¤erent system ic risk ind ices and the m ean, 25% centile and
10% centile of the banks distance to defau lt.
tively. The coe¢ cient on the distance-to-default is signicantly negative in all
specications. The degree of correspondance (coe¢ cient of partial correlation
R2) between the index and the estimated regression is very high (mostly over
80%). The results from the regression with correlation are less convincing: We
have a very low coe¢ cients of partial correlation (with the exception of the
90% centile in the long sample) and in the short sample, most coe¢ cients are
not signicant.
Not surprisingly, these regression results coincide with those obtained from
the rank correlation analysis. The common exposure (i.e. AD ratio correla-
tion) is a poor predictor of the systemic risk index and the direction of its
relation changes depending on the period. The distance-to-default, by con-
trast, explains well the systemic risk index. This di¤erence in precision is
illustrated by Figure 6. In each panel, the actual systemic risk index is com-
pared with its value estimated with a linear function of one of the two factors
(i.e. common exposure and distance-to-default, respectively). The match be-
tween the systemic risk index and its estimation based on the 10% percentile
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Table 4
Regression of the systemic risk index on correlation and distance-to-default
World 10% World 20%
Regressor Coe¢ cient R2 Coe¢ cient R2
19
93
-2
00
6
Mean correlation 7.6496* 0.0396 17.4344** 0.1416
75% centile of correlations 10.4503** 0.1271 20.1928** 0.3220
90% centile of correlations 15.8976** 0.5599 25.3561** 0.7423
Mean distance-to-default -0.5073** 0.7761 -0.8087** 0.8164
25% cent. of distance-to-defaults -0.6618** 0.8601 -1.1114** 0.8683
10% cent. of distance-to-defaults -0.9528** 0.8545 -1.4776** 0.7810
19
97
-2
00
6
Mean correlation -4.1073 0.0234 -0.4085 0.0001
75% centile of correlations -3.2653 0.0306 -0.3175 0.0001
90% centile of correlations -3.6337* 0.0473 0.0664 0.0000
Mean distance-to-default -0.5672** 0.8735 -0.9852** 0.8830
25% cent. of distance-to-defaults -0.7476** 0.8908 -1.2656** 0.8935
10% cent. of distance-to-defaults -1.0445** 0.7599 -1.9254** 0.7650
* (**) ind icates that the co e¢ cient is sign icant at a 5% (1% ) level.
of distance-to-default is striking (right and lower panel of Figure 6). Taking
distance-to-default as a proxy for measuring systemic risk seems to give a
fairly good and easily obtainable estimation of it.
However, while the distance-to-default seems to be the main factor driving
the systemic risk, the common exposure might account for the portion of the
systemic risk index that is not explained by the distance-to-default. To check
that, we compute the rank correlation between the common exposure and the
residuals of a regression of the systemic risk index on the distance-to-default.
The idea is to check if a positive residual (i.e., an "excess" of systemic risk
given what is estimated by distance-to-default) is associated with a high or a
low common exposure. The rank correlations are presented in Table 5.
The results show that residuals are positively correlated with common expo-
sure. For example, the Spearman rank correlation between the mean AD ratio
correlation and the systemic risk left unexplained by the mean distance-to-
default (residuals of the regression of the systemic risk on the mean distance-
to-default) is 0.65. This degree of correlation is signicantly higher than be-
tween common exposures and the systemic risk index (cf. Table 3), suggesting
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Fig. 5. Systemic risk index vs. AD correlations (left) or distance-to-default (right)
(long sample)
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Fig. 6. Estimated systemic risk index (long sample)
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that the e¤ect of common exposures on the unexplained part of systemic risk is
greater than on the systemic risk itself. We also see that the rank correlations
are always positive. This means that, once the distance-to-default is taken into
account, a higher common exposure always induces a higher systemic risk.
To summarize, we nd that the systemic risk dynamic does not match the
dynamic observed for bankscommon exposure. This indicates that common
exposure is probably not the main factor explaining systemic risk. Indeed,
further analyses reveal that the banksdistance-to-defaults, which describes
banksindividual risk taking, is the main force driving systemic risk. However,
we nd that common exposures explain relatively well the part of systemic
risk left "unexplained" by the distance-to-default. We also nd that, once the
distance to default is taken into account, higher common exposure induces
higher systemic risk.
Note that we have also tried to disentangle the e¤ect of the distance-to-default
between the AD ratios level, which represents the reserves that the banks
can use to absorb shocks, and its volatility, which measures the risk of their
investments. We found that both elements are of equal importance to explain
the evolution of the systemic risk. The volatility plays a signicant role in
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Table 5
Rank correlation with residuals
Residuals from equation Factor Spearman Kendalls
using: coe¢ cient tau
19
93
-2
00
6
Mean distance-to-default Mean correlation 0.6468 0.4638
75% perc. correlation 0.5845 0.4142
90% perc. correlation 0.5158 0.3677
10% perc. distance-to- Mean correlation 0.3944 0.2752
default 75% perc. correlation 0.3476 0.2366
90% perc. correlation 0.3079 0.2079
19
97
-2
00
6
Mean distance-to-default Mean correlation 0.6509 0.4540
75% perc. correlation 0.6185 0.4166
90% perc. correlation 0.5300 0.3683
10% perc. distance-to- Mean correlation 0.4914 0.3428
default 75% perc. correlation 0.4630 0.3211
90% perc. correlation 0.3757 0.2565
explaining the observed peaks whereas the AD ratios level is more relevant in
other time.
6 Conclusion
The rst question addressed by this paper is: How have bankscommon expo-
sures to shocks changed over the last decade in response to the changes in the
environment in which the international banking sector operates? To answer
this, we estimate the correlations between large international banksasset-to-
debt (AD) ratios over 1993-2006 with the exible M-GARCH approach de-
veloped by Ledoit, Santa-Clara, and Wolf (2003). We nd a decreasing trend
until 2000, followed by an increasing trend. This suggests that, during the
nineties, banks (or at least some of them) took advantage of the new tech-
nologies and markets available to them to pursue their own business strategies
and to di¤erentiate themselves from other banks, thus reducing their areas of
common exposure. Since 2000, however, banksareas of common exposure to
shocks have increased rapidly, which could indicate that they are adopting
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increasingly similar strategies and moving into increasingly similar markets.
This nding is also robust for di¤erent sub-groups of the sample.
The papers second question concerns the impact of these trends on systemic
risk in the banking sector. From a theoretical point of view, ongoing nan-
cial market integration and increasing cross-border activities may have both
favourable and adverse e¤ects on the stability of the banking system. To ex-
plore this question empirically, we construct a systemic risk index based on
Lehar (2005), for which systemic risk is dened as the probability of a joint
failure of a critical number of banks. As opposed to the correlation analy-
sis, no clear trend emerges. Instead, we observe two peaks, one at the end of
1998 (LTCM and Russian crisis) and the other in 2002-2003 (stock market
downturn), with the latter mainly doing damage to European banks.
The di¤erent patterns observed for bankscommon exposure and for systemic
risk contradict the widespread view that systemic risk increases with banksco-
movement. Our results conrm that the correlation between AD ratios is not a
reliable measure for systemic risk. Instead, we nd that the distance-to-default
is the main driver of the systemic risk index. Once this distance-to-default is
taken into account, however, correlation is positively associated with systemic
risk.
These ndings have two direct consequences for supervisory authorities: First,
they show that systemic risk cannot be viewed as a pure correlation phe-
nomenon. Instead, they highlight the danger of high and volatile leverages.
According to our results, the main driver of systemic risk is the size of the
risks taken by each bank individually (reected by their distance-to-default)
and not their common exposure to shocks (i.e. AD ratio correlation). Thus,
supervisors concerned by systemic stability should rst concentrate on making
sure that banks are not taking disproportionate risks before trying to reduce
inter-linkages or enforcing diversication in the banking sector. Second, from
the monitoring point of view, co-movements between banks appear to be a
spurious measure of systemic risk. Taken individually, this measure gives, in
the best case, a weak indication about systemic risk and, in the worst case, may
even point in the wrong direction. To be useful and unambiguous about the
evolution of systemic risk, co-movement must be interpreted in combination
with distance-to-default.
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A Reduced form asset and debt dynamics
Developping each equation of the system264dAt
dDt
375 =
264At 0
0 Dt
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375 dt+
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264AA AD
DA DD
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yields
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which are both Itô processes where
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Using Itôs formula, we get that
d lnAit =
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To get the dynamic of dzit, note that z
i
t = lnA
i
t   lnDit, which implies that
dzit = d lnA
i
t   d lnDit. Using the two previous equations in this expression
gives
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We can see that the dynamic of the AD ratio sums up the instantaneous growth
rate of the banks asset and debts as well as all interactions with shocks to its
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own and other banksassets and debts.
Regrouping this equation for all the banks in one single system yields
dzt = dt+dw
B Simulation algorithm
To compute the systemic crisis index It (), we start the simulation at time t
with the vector of AD ratio zt and the estimated covariance matrix Ht. The
simulation uses the following algorithm:
(1) Generate a vector et containing N independent standard white noises. et
simulates the independent shocks to the AD ratios.
(2) Generate the vector ut from the vector et with a Choleski decomposition
of the variance-covariance matrix Ht. ut is the total e¤ect of the di¤erent
individual shocks et on each AD ratio.
(3) Generate the new vector zt+1 = zt +zt+1 with Equation (??).
(4) For each bank, check if zit+1 < 0 (insolvency condition). If bank i becomes
insolvent, set bit = 1.
(5) Check if there is a systemic crisis, i.e. if
PN
i=1 
i
tb
i
t > . Stop the algorithm
if there is a systemic crisis.
(6) If there is no systemic crisis, compute the new variance-covariance ma-
trix Ht+1 with Equation (8), the vector ut generated in Step 2 and the
estimated coe¢ cient matrices ~C, ~A and ~B.
(7) Repeat Steps 1 to 6 k times.
For each period, repeat this algorithmM times. The probability of a systemic
crisis is then estimated by the number of times that the algorithm has stopped
over M .
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